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U.C.L.A. Law Review 
Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses 
in Immigration Cases  
Fatma E. Marouf
ABSTRACT
This Article supports taking a deeper look at federal common law defenses’ applicability in 
immigration cases.  On the rare occasions when noncitizens attempt to raise common law defenses, 
immigration judges tend to dismiss such defenses offhand simply because removal proceedings 
are technically civil, not criminal.  Yet many common law defenses may be raised in civil cases. 
Additionally, immigration proceedings have become increasingly intertwined with the criminal 
system.  After examining how judges already rely on federal common law to fill in gaps in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), this Article proposes three categories of removal cases 
that are particularly well-suited for raising federal common law defenses.  The first category 
involves INA provisions that require conduct to be unlawful without requiring a conviction; the 
second category involves INA provisions barring asylum, which are closely connected to criminal 
culpability principles; and the third category involves certain removal grounds with no explicit 
mens rea requirement.  Finally, the Article examines some of the legal and practical challenges to 
prevailing with these defenses in the removal context, drawing on criminal cases in which such 
defenses have been raised to immigration-related charges.  The Article concludes that a more 
principled approach to the use of federal common law defenses in removal proceedings is necessary 
in order to promote consistent and fair adjudication. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Neither courts nor scholars have adequately explored the relationship 
between federal common law and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).1  
This Article supports taking a deeper look at federal common law defenses’ 
applicability in immigration cases.  On the rare occasions when noncitizens 
attempt to raise common law defenses, immigration judges tend to dismiss them 
offhand simply because immigration proceedings are technically civil in nature.  
Yet many common law defenses originated in the civil context and continue to 
be applied in civil matters.2 
At the same time, immigration proceedings have become increasingly 
intertwined with the criminal system.3  This has occurred through the initiation 
of removal proceedings based on criminal arrests and deportation of noncitizens 
with criminal convictions,4 federal criminal prosecutions for immigration 
violations,5 and state and local police officers’ involvement in all aspects of 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.).  
2. See infra Part II (discussing origins and requirements for common law defenses); see also 
Christopher N. Lasch, A Common-Law Privilege to Protect State and Local Courts During 
the Crimmigration Crisis, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 410 (2017) (explaining that the common law 
doctrine of privilege from arrest was applied primarily in civil cases and provides a way to 
challenge U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) recent practice of arresting 
immigrants in state and local courthouses). 
3. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of 
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 257–58 (2011) (discussing how states 
prosecute aliens for violating federal immigration law); Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting 
Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1350 (2010) (discussing how “criminal law can 
function as immigration law”); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Policing Sex, Policing Immigrants: 
What Crimmigration’s Past Can Tell Us About Its Present and Its Future, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 
149, 153 (2016) (discussing how overpolicing of communities of color is being used to 
implement a mass deportation system); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: 
Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 377 (2006) (discussing “the 
confluence of criminal and immigration law”). 
4. U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL 
OPERATIONS REPORT (2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/ 
2016/removal-stats-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/52AL-PV4B] (stating that 58 percent of all 
ICE removals and 92 percent of ICE removal from the country’s interior were convicted 
criminals); see also U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT 
AND REMOVAL REPORT 4 (2018), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/BH4G-76FJ] 
(stating that 73.7 percent of ICE’s administrative arrests involved convicted criminals). 
5. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, PROSECUTING MIGRANTS FOR COMING TO THE UNITED STATES (2018), 
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/immigration-prosecutions 
[https://perma.cc/RKS5-BUT9]; John Gramlich & Kristen Bailik, Immigration Offenses Make 
Up a Growing Share of Federal Arrests, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Apr. 10, 2017), 
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immigration enforcement.6  Under the Trump administration, state and local 
law enforcement officers are playing an ever-greater role in immigration 
enforcement through the reinstatement of the Secure Communities program, 
which requires participating jails to submit fingerprints to immigration 
databases, reinvigoration of 287(g) cooperation agreements, which deputize 
police to participate in immigration enforcement, and laws such as SB 4 in Texas 
that threaten officers with fines and jail time for failing to cooperate with U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).7 
Not only are the immigration and criminal systems interconnected, but 
removal proceedings also share many of criminal proceedings’ trappings 
without offering similar protections, such as access to court-appointed counsel.8  
Noncitizens are charged under the INA, must plead to these charges, may be 
detained during the proceedings, and face the severe penalty of deportation if 
found removable.  While immigration judges are well versed in various 
 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/10/immigration-offenses-make-up-a-
growing-share-of-federal-arrests [https://perma.cc/N5p9-E86X] (stating that half of all 
federal prosecutions are for immigration violations). 
6. National Map of 287(g) Agreements, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (May 2, 2018), 
https://www.ilrc.org/national-map-287g-agreements [https://perma.cc/9QZM-Q42A] 
(showing a map of seventy-six jurisdictions with 287(g) cooperation agreements between 
local law enforcement agencies and ICE, forty-eight of which were entered into under the 
Trump administration).  Section 287(g) of the INA allows the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to deputize state and local law enforcement officers to enforce immigration 
laws within their jurisdiction.  8 U.S.C. 1357(g).  ICE enters into a Memorandum of 
Understanding often called a “287(g) agreement” with the law enforcement agency and 
provides officers a four-week training course.  See Delegation of Immigration Authority 
Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (last 
updated Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/287g [https://perma.cc/XF3G-Q9JA]. 
7. Maggie Astor, Texas’ Ban on ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Can Begin, Appeals Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/texas-immigration-law-
sb4.html; Inés Valdez, Mat Coleman & Amna Akbar, Donald Trump Says He’s Just 
Enforcing Immigration Law.  But It’s Not That Simple, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Nov. 7, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/11/06/donald-
trump-says-hes-just-enforcing-immigration-law-but-its-not-that-simple 
[https://perma.cc/J6NX-SRUR]; Miriam Valverde, Trump Says Secure Communities, 287(g) 
Immigration Programs Worked, POLITIFACT (Sep. 6, 2016, 5:17 PM), 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/sep/06/donald-trump/trump-
says-secure-communities-287g-immigration-pro [https://perma.cc/TG8G-MDY6]. 
8. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 469 (2007) (explaining that “immigration 
law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities associated with 
criminal enforcement while explicitly rejecting the procedural ingredients of criminal 
adjudication”); Fatma E. Marouf, Incompetent but Deportable: The Case for a Right to 
Mental Competence in Removal Proceedings, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 929, 957–959 (2014) 
(explaining that “[a]lmost every aspect of removal proceedings more closely resembles a 
criminal proceeding than a civil one”). 
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applications for relief from removal set forth in the INA, such as asylum, 
cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure, affirmative defenses are 
generally unfamiliar territory.9  Noncitizens usually concede removability, even 
if represented by counsel.  At that point, if they are lucky enough to be eligible for 
some form of relief from removal, they can submit an application.  But the 
number of disqualifying factors, high legal standards, and discretionary nature 
of many applications make it extremely difficult for noncitizens to win relief. 
Recognizing common law defenses to removal would help shift the 
asymmetric relationship between the proceedings’ quasicriminal nature and the 
limited remedies available.10  This shift is needed more than ever in the current 
political climate, as ICE has largely ceased exercising prosecutorial discretion 
and is aggressively pursuing removal regardless of a noncitizen’s age, health 
condition, or other sympathetic circumstances.11  While common law defenses 
may not be applicable to all inadmissibility and deportability grounds, they can 
potentially affect the outcome in a subset of cases.12  More guidance is needed, 
however, from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and federal courts 
regarding the defenses’ elements in the removal context, as well as whether they 
constitute complete defenses or mitigating factors.  Adopting a principled 
approach to the use of common law defenses is essential to ensure more 
consistent and predictable decisions. 
Part I of this Article examines federal common law’s role in interpreting 
federal statutes, arguing that even a complex and detailed statute like the INA has 
holes in its legislative tapestry that should be filled by common law doctrines.  As 
courts have recognized, the U.S. Congress “legislates against the backdrop of the 
 
9. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158, 1229(b), 1229(c) (2018) (concerning asylum, various forms of 
cancellation of removal, and departure). 
10. See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?  Immigration Courts and the Adjudication 
of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010) (discussing the absence of 
an adequate remedy for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations in removal proceedings); 
Legomsky, supra note 8 (explaining that “immigration law has been absorbing the theories, 
methods, perceptions, and priorities associated with criminal enforcement while explicitly 
rejecting the procedural ingredients of criminal adjudication”). 
11. See Julie Rheinstrom, Current Developments: One Hundred Days of President Trump’s 
Executive Orders, 31 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 433, 434–39 (2017) (calling the breadth of Trump’s 
immigration enforcement priorities “staggering”); Caitlin Dickerson, Immigration Arrests 
Rise Sharply as a Trump Mandate Is Carried Out, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/17/us/immigration-enforcement-ice-arrests.html. 
12. While deportability refers to removing someone from the United States after he or she has 
been admitted, inadmissibility generally refers to precluding someone from entering the 
United States, obtaining a visa, or adjusting status to become a legal permanent resident.  See 
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227 (2018). 
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common law”;13 it does not write “on a blank slate,”14 which means that Congress 
anticipates that common law will be used to flesh out the legislation it enacts.  
Part I also points out how courts already rely on various common law doctrines 
in interpreting the INA. 
Part II discusses several specific types of common law defenses, including 
justification defenses (necessity and self-defense), excuse defenses (duress, 
infancy, and insanity), and equitable defenses (entrapment by estoppel, 
equitable estoppel, and laches).  This Part demonstrates that courts have 
recognized all of these defenses in civil cases, and some have been utilized in 
claims arising under the INA. 
Part III argues that these common law defenses are also relevant to removal 
proceedings.  This Part discusses three categories of cases in which common law 
defenses are particularly viable, in part because of a small body of existing cases 
recognizing their role.  The first category involves INA provisions that require 
conduct to be “unlawful” or to “violate” a criminal statute without requiring a 
conviction.  This is the most clear-cut category, since adjudicators should 
consider common law defenses to alleged offenses in order to determine whether 
the conduct at issue is actually unlawful.  The second category involves INA 
provisions containing certain bars to asylum and a related form of relief called 
withholding of removal, which are derived from the United Nations (UN) 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and are closely connected to 
criminal culpability principles.  The third category involves certain 
inadmissibility and deportability grounds under the INA with no explicit mens 
rea requirement and, therefore, no backdoor to introducing factors such as age, 
insanity, or duress.  In this category of cases, a common law defense may be the 
only way to avoid removal. 
Finally, Part IV examines some of the legal and practical challenges 
involved in raising common law defenses in removal proceedings, drawing on 
criminal cases in which such defenses have been raised to immigration-related 
charges. 
 
13. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2286 (2016) (citing Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991)). 
14. Meyers v. Oneida Tribe, 836 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that Indian tribes possess 
common law immunity because the U.S. Congress did not write “on a blank slate”). 
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I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW’S ROLE IN INTERPRETING THE IMMIGRATION 
AND NATIONALITY ACT (INA) 
Long ago, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that there is a “federal 
common law” that fashions substantive rules not expressly authorized by statute 
or the Constitution.15  Commentators have explained that “[t]he difference 
between the judicial creation of federal common law and the application of 
federal statutes to specific cases, especially when it involves the construction and 
enforcement of broadly worded provisions, is one of degree.”16  The Supreme 
Court has identified two categories of cases in which courts are competent to 
create federal common law: “those in which a federal rule of decision is necessary 
to protect ‘uniquely federal interests,’ . . . and those in which Congress has given 
the courts the power to develop substantive law.”17  If an area of law is governed 
by a “pervasively federal framework,” as is immigration, it is appropriate for 
federal courts to “pronounce [federal] common law that will fill the interstices” 
in the statute.18  Filling such gaps in the statute may include “construing vague 
statutory terms, supplying omitted procedural rules, or determining claims and 
 
15. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) 
(explaining that “whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between 
the two States is a question of ‘federal common law’”). 
16. 19 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper,  Federal Practice & 
Procedure § 4514 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2015) ; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and 
Wechsler’s the Federal Courts and the Federal System 635 (7th ed. 2015) (“Common 
lawmaking often cannot be sharply distinguished from statutory or constitutional 
interpretation.  As specific evidence of legislative purpose with respect to the issue at hand 
attenuates, much interpretation shades into judicial lawmaking.”). 
17. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981). 
18. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 336 (1981) (“If the federal interest is sufficiently 
strong, federal common law may be drawn upon in settling disputes even though the statute 
or Constitution alone provides no precise answer to the question posed.”);  see also United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973) (“[T]he inevitable 
incompleteness presented by all legislation means that interstitial federal law-making is a 
basic responsibility of the federal courts.”); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
448, 457 (1957) (“It is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal 
rights are concerned.”);  see also Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary 
International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 426 (1997) 
(explaining that because immigration law has traditionally been understood to be governed 
solely by federal law, “the courts had little difficulty developing a body of federal law 
governing immigration, in the absence of congressional authorization, despite the rhetoric 
of no federal common law”);  A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and 
International Cases, 20 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 59 (1995) (arguing that federal common law of 
foreign relations should be limited to three circumstances, one of which is “immigration 
matters”). 
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defenses that may be asserted when the elements of a statutory cause of action 
have been set out in general terms.”19 
A. Relevant Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
In examining the role that federal common law plays in interpreting the 
INA, two statutory construction canons are particularly relevant.  First, statutes 
in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed.20  As the Supreme 
Court explained, “[s]tatutes which invade the common law . . . are to be read 
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar 
principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.”21  In order 
to rebut the presumption, a statute “must ‘speak directly’ to the question 
addressed by the common law.”22   
William Eskridge has argued that “[a]n updated version of the old meta-
rule is that the common law can be used to fill in statutory gaps, unless it is 
inconsistent with the overall statutory policy.”23  Eskridge has proposed three 
reasons why the Supreme Court invokes common law rules to fill in statutory 
gaps: First, “the common law offers a readily accessible body of rules”; second, 
“private parties already are generally familiar with such rules and are accustomed 
to following them”; and third, “common law rules represent public values,” that 
is, “they have been the object of judicial trial-and-error and critical commentary 
and are, as a result, thought to represent good policy.”24  These reasons help show 
why it makes sense to recognize common law defenses in interpreting the INA 
when the statute is silent on their applicability. 
 
19. 19 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 16, at § 4515. 
20. See, e.g., Shaw v. R.R. Co., 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565 (1879) (explaining that no statute 
should be construed as altering common law further than its words import); Wheaton v. 
Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 692 (1834) (“[I]f a thing is at common law, a statute cannot 
restrain it, unless it be in negative words.”); see generally 3 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE 
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.1 (7th ed. 2007) 
(discussing canon on derogation of common law). 
21. Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). 
22. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (holding that the “Debt Collection Act left 
in place the federal common law governing the obligation of the States to pay prejudgment 
interest on debts owed to the Federal Government”); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 
U.S. 259, 268 (1993) (“Certain [common law] immunities were so well established in 1871, 
when § 1983 was enacted, that ‘we presume that Congress would have specifically so 
provided had it wished to abolish’ them.” (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967))). 
23. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 
1051 (1989). 
24. Id. 
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Another highly relevant statutory construction canon provides that 
common law’s repeal by implication is disfavored.25  Based on this principle, the 
Supreme Court over a century ago advised: 
[A] statute will not be construed as taking away a common law right 
existing at the date of its enactment, unless that result is imperatively 
required; that is to say, unless it be found that the pre-existing right is 
so repugnant to the statute that the survival of such right would in 
effect deprive the subsequent statute of its efficacy; in other words, 
renders its provisions nugatory.26 
More recent cases confirm this principle’s continued relevance.27 
At the same time, however, the Court has cautioned that “[f]ederal 
courts . . . are not general common law courts”28 and “the authority to construe a 
statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a new rule or to 
provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt.”29  In 
interpreting the Death on the High Seas Act, for example, the Court stated that 
although the statute “does not address every issue of wrongful-death 
law, . . . when it does speak directly to a question, the courts are not free to 
‘supplement’ Congress’ answer so thoroughly that the Act becomes 
meaningless.”30  Thus, “[t]here is a basic difference between filling a gap left by 
Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has affirmatively and 
specifically enacted.”31 
The case that may pose the strongest challenge to utilizing common law 
defenses in immigration cases is City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan.32  
There, the Court held that a comprehensive statutory program, the Federal 
Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972, displaced federal common law 
claims brought by Illinois and Michigan.33  The Court stressed that “when the 
 
25. See generally 2B NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50:1 (7th ed. 2007). 
26. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907); see also Shaw v. 
R.R. Co., 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565 (1879) (explaining that “[n]o statute is to be construed 
as altering the common law, farther than its words import”). 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (explaining that to abrogate the 
common law, a statute must “‘speak directly’ to the question addressed by the common law” 
(quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978))); Astoria Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); St. Regis Paper Co., v. United States, 368 
U.S. 208, 218 (1961); Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952). 
28. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981). 
29. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981). 
30. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978). 
31. Id. 
32.   451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
33. Id. 
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question is whether federal statutory or federal common law governs . . . we start 
with the assumption that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the 
appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal common law.”34 
The Court has upheld federal common law rights, however, under other 
federal statutes.  For example, in United States v. Texas,35 the Court held that the 
federal Debt Collection Act of 198236 did not abrogate the U.S. government’s 
federal common law right to collect prejudgment interest on debts the states 
owed it.37  While the Court agreed with Texas that “Congress need not 
affirmatively proscribe the common-law doctrine at issue,” it stressed that 
“courts may take it as a given that Congress has legislated with an expectation 
that the common law principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident.”38 
The Tenth Circuit, which was the only appellate court that reached the 
same conclusion as the Supreme Court on the federal common law issues, 
interpreted City of Milwaukee to apply to situations in which there is a 
“comprehensive statutory program.”39  The court explained that the question 
resolved in City of Milwaukee was “whether the comprehensive nature of the 
[Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (FWPCA) of 197240] has 
supplanted federal common law in that area,” noting that “[t]he [Supreme] 
Court stated that federal common law applies ‘[u]ntil the field has been made the 
subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administrative standards.’”41  
In other words, “Congress had not left the formulation of appropriate federal 
water pollution standards to the courts through application of nuisance 
concepts, but had occupied the field through the establishment of a 
comprehensive regulatory program under the Amendments.”42  The Tenth 
Circuit distinguished the Debt Collection Act of 1982 from the FWPCA, 
explaining that the Debt Collection Act of 1982  “cannot be seen as the total 
 
34. Id. at 316–17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35.  507 U.S. 529 (1993). 
36.   Pub. L. 97-365, 96 Stat. 1749 (1982) (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1114 and scattered 
sections of 5 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.). 
37. Texas, 507 U.S. at 533–35. 
38. Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
39. Gallegos v. Lyng, 891 F.2d 788, 798 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding that allowing interest to be 
collected from states with overdue debts to the federal government is an example of “filling 
a gap left by Congress’ silence” in the Debt Collection Act of 1982). 
40.   Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2018)). 
41. Id. (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981)). 
42. Id. (summarizing City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981)). 
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restructuring and complete rewriting of existing debt collection law as were the 
FWPCA with respect to water pollution law.”43 
B. Using Common Law to Interpret the INA 
The INA, like the FWPCA, is a very detailed and comprehensive statute.44  
One might argue, therefore, based on City of Milwaukee, that reference to federal 
common law is not permitted, much less required, in interpreting the INA.  But, 
courts have continued to refer to federal common law in interpreting some other 
complex and comprehensive statutes, such as the Labor Management Relations 
Act (LMRA) of 194745 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) of 1974.46  In fact, the Supreme Court has found that both the LMRA 
and ERISA authorize federal courts to develop uniform federal common law, 
although it has found that other statutes do not grant judicial authority to create 
federal common law.47  Additionally, appellate courts have held that the 
“creation of a central regulatory authority” does not mean “abolition of common 
law rights, unless their retention would render the regulatory scheme 
ineffective.”48 
The INA neither expressly overrides nor explicitly preserves federal 
common law.  Despite its complexity, there are still many gaps that common law 
may fill without rendering the legislative scheme ineffective.  In City of 
 
43. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
44. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 395 (2012) (“Federal governance of immigration 
and alien status is extensive and complex.”); Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 
582, 587 (2011) (stating that the INA “established a ‘comprehensive federal statutory scheme 
for regulation of immigration and naturalization’ and set ‘the terms and conditions of 
admission to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens lawfully in the country.’” 
(quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 353, 359 (1976))). 
45.  Pub.L. 80-101, 61 Stat 136 (codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 141–187 (2018)). 
46.  Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 
U.S.C.). 
47. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54–56 (1987) (holding that courts have power 
to develop federal common law under Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA)); 
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (holding that section 301 
of the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes federal courts to develop uniform 
common law).  But see, e.g., Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966) 
(holding that no provision of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 allowed the Court to develop 
federal common law to decide disputes among private parties dealing in the leases);  
Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651–52 (1963) (holding that a statute governing 
congressional-subpoena issuance, and violation of that statute, did not result in private 
action “arising” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and distinguishing Lincoln Mills). 
48. Kotz v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 685 F.2d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that retention 
of common law fraud actions is not inconsistent with the scheme for regulation in the 
Commodities Exchange Act). 
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Milwaukee, the Court reasoned that when Congress addresses a question that 
was previously governed by federal common law, there is no longer a need to rely 
on federal common law.49  This suggests that when Congress has not addressed 
a question previously governed by federal common law, such as whether a 
particular defense is available, then common law may help fill the interstices in 
the statute.  As the Fourth Circuit has noted, although “a federal court is not 
entitled to rewrite a statute written by Congress to recognize a common law 
defense, it still can conclude that Congress impliedly recognized the defense 
when enacting the statute.”50 
The BIA, which is the administrative appellate body that reviews the 
decisions of immigration judges, as well as the federal circuit courts that review 
the BIA’s decisions, have long applied federal common law to fill in various gaps 
in the INA’s framework.  Examples of common law doctrines that the BIA and 
federal courts routinely apply to immigration cases include res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, waiver, equitable tolling, and the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine.  The BIA and federal courts also use common law to interpret 
inadmissibility and deportability grounds, as well as terms of art in the INA.  
These adjudicative bodies have even created their own common law doctrines 
specific to the INA, such as the consular nonreviewability doctrine. 
The Supreme Court has instructed that the common law doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estopped are to be applied “to those determinations of 
administrative bodies that have attained finality.”51  In applying these common 
law doctrines to immigration cases, the BIA and courts have reasoned that they 
“do[] not contravene the language of the INA or congressional intent” and are 
“well-established,” allowing courts to “imply that Congress has legislated with an 
expectation that the principle will apply except when a statutory purpose to the 
contrary is evident.”52   
 
49. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981). 
50. United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 492 (4th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added). 
51. Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107 (1991); see also Bravo-Pedroza 
v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 1358, 1359–60 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying res judicata against the 
government where the government failed to challenge a prior decision); Fedorenko, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 57, 61 (B.I.A. 1984); Barragan-Garibay, 15 I. & N. Dec. 77, 78–79 (B.I.A. 1974) (“We 
have applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent the relitigation of issues that have 
been determined in previous court litigation between the Government and the alien.”); 
Grandi, 13 I. & N. Dec. 798 (B.I.A. 1971) (holding that the applicant was collaterally 
estopped from arguing that he was brought to the United States against his will after, in 
criminal proceedings, a court had considered the same contention and found that the 
applicant came to the United States voluntarily). 
52. Duvall v. Attorney Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir. 2006); Duhaney v. Attorney Gen., 621 
F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For instance, courts have 
held that the government’s failure to prove alienage collaterally estops the government from 
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Courts also regularly apply the waiver doctrine in immigration cases, such 
that arguments not raised before the BIA are deemed waived and cannot be 
made to the reviewing court.53  By contrast, courts are divided regarding whether 
the common law doctrines of estoppel and waiver apply to other complex 
statutes, such as ERISA.54  In addition, courts frequently apply the common law 
doctrine of equitable tolling, which allows litigants to bring claims even after a 
statute of limitations expires, in addressing the timeliness of motions to reopen 
that are filed after the deadline provided in the INA.55  In immigration cases, just 
 
relitigating the issue in subsequent proceedings.  See, e.g., Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 
749, 750–51 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that a failure of proof on the alienage issue 
collaterally estops the INS from relitigating the issue in subsequent proceedings).  Similarly, 
once the government concedes citizenship, it is collaterally estopped from relitigating that 
issue.  Medina v. INS, 993 F.2d 499, 502–04, n.15 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding that collateral 
estoppel is consistent with the INA and precludes relitigating an individual’s citizenship if 
the issue was conceded by the INS during a prior proceeding); see also Hamdan v. Gonzales, 
425 F.3d 1051, 1059 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Res judicata (as well as the related principle of collateral 
estoppel) applies to administrative proceedings such as the adjudication of petitions for 
relief in immigration courts.”); Santana-Albarran v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 699, 704 (6th Cir. 
2005) (applying a five-part test for collateral estoppel to determine if the doctrine is 
applicable to resolving the issue of when the petitioner entered the United States).  However, 
the res judicata doctrine does not bar the government from lodging new removability 
charges.  Duhaney, 621 F.3d at 347 (holding that the res judicata doctrine did not bar the 
government from lodging additional removability charges following vacatur of the alien’s 
controlled substance conviction and that the government was not precluded from lodging 
new removal charges based on convictions disclosed in an alien’s application for a 
discretionary waiver of removability). 
53. See, e.g., Singh v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1152, 1157 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Issues not raised in an 
appellant’s opening brief are typically deemed waived.” (citation omitted)); Strantzalis v. 
INS, 465 F.2d 1016, 1018 n.3 (3d Cir. 1972) (“When an alien is informed of his right to retain 
private counsel [under 8 U.S.C. § 1362] and the alien decides to proceed on his own, he has 
waived any right provided by this section.”); see also Thomason v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 9 F.3d 
645, 648 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that federal common law waiver principles are not as well-
established as estoppel principles). 
54. See White v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the federal common law doctrines of waiver and estoppel do not apply to ERISA contracts).  
But see Pitts v. Am. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 931 F.2d 351, 357–58 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing 
waiver as a viable claim under ERISA); Thomason, 9 F.3d at 647–49 (leaving open the 
question of whether the waiver doctrine applies in the ERISA context, but rejecting the 
waiver argument made by the plaintiff in this case); Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 
33 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 1994) (same). 
55. See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10–11 (2014) (describing equitable tolling as “a 
long-established feature of American jurisprudence derived from ‘the old chancery rule’” 
(quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946))).  Under the INA and its 
regulations, a respondent may file only one motion to reopen and must do so within ninety 
days of the BIA’s decision.  INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 
1003.23(b)(1) (2018).  However, the BIA and circuit courts have held that these 
requirements are not jurisdictional and are subject to equitable tolling.  See Holland v. 
Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (recognizing the longstanding equitable tolling principle); 
Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2009) (accepting the equitable tolling doctrine, so long 
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like in other types of cases, litigants must show exceptional circumstances and 
due diligence for courts to apply the equitable tolling doctrine.56 
Courts have further drawn on federal common law in immigration cases 
when interpreting particular deportability and inadmissibility grounds.  In 
determining whether a given conviction triggers a deportability or 
inadmissibility ground under the INA, courts apply a method of analysis called 
the categorical approach, which involves comparing the elements of the state 
statute under which an individual has been convicted to the federal generic 
crime’s elements.57  If the state statute’s elements are broader than the federal 
generic offense, a conviction under that statute does not count as a conviction 
for immigration purposes.  Performing this analysis requires first defining the 
federal generic crime’s elements.  In defining federal generic crimes, courts have 
drawn on federal common law, along with other federal law sources.58 
 
as certain criteria are met).  In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that nearly all 
appellate courts had held that the BIA “may sometimes equitably toll the time limit for an 
alien’s motion to reopen.”  Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150, 2156 (2015).  In determining 
whether a motion to reopen a deadline should be equitably tolled, courts generally require 
showing that: (1) the delay was due to an extraordinary circumstance; and (2) reopening was 
pursued with due diligence.  Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007) (holding that an 
extraordinary circumstance is necessary to warrant equitable tolling); Iturribarria v. INS, 
321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizing equitable tolling in situations where the 
petitioner is prevented from filing due to “deception, fraud, or error, as long as the petitioner 
acts with due diligence”). 
56. Mata, 135 S. Ct. at 2156. 
57. The Supreme Court has clarified the proper application of the categorical and modified 
categorical approaches in a string of recent cases, including Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 
137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017); Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016); Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 
S. Ct. 1980 (2014); Descamps v. Holder, 570 U.S. 254 (2013); and Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 
U.S. 184 (2013). 
58. See Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 189–90 (2007) (adopting a federal generic 
“theft” definition in determining whether “aiding and interpreting” a theft is a “theft 
offense” under the INA); Etienne v. Lynch, 813 F.3d 135, 143 (4th Cir. 2015) (“To determine 
the meaning of the term ‘conspiracy’ in the INA, our analysis begins with the ‘settled 
principle of statutory construction that, absent contrary indications, Congress intends to 
adopt the common law definition of statutory terms’”(quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 
U.S. 10, 13 (1994))); Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the 
Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 280 (2012).  But see Taylor v. U.S., 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990) (declining to 
“constru[e] ‘burglary’ to mean common-law burglary,” because that “would come close to 
nullifying that term’s effect in the statute,” since “few of the crimes now generally recognized 
as burglaries would fall within the common-law definition”); De Lima v. Sessions, 867 F.3d 
260, 266 (1st Cir. 2017) (deciding not to limit a “theft offense” to the common law definition 
in holding that theft of services constitutes a “theft offense” under the INA). 
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Similarly, courts have developed federal common law in order to interpret 
terms in the INA such as “good moral character.”59  Someone who lacks good 
moral character can be denied citizenship and other immigration benefits.60  
Sodomy and adultery used to be bars to good moral character.61  In construing 
those terms, courts refused to rely on varying state definitions and instead 
developed federal common law to define them,62 which promoted uniformity in 
adjudicating naturalization applications.63 
Courts have also held that the common law fugitive disentitlement doctrine 
applies to immigration cases.  This doctrine, which the Supreme Court first 
applied in the late nineteenth century, provides courts with discretion to dismiss 
the appeal of an individual who is a fugitive from justice during the appeal’s 
pendency.64  Courts have reasoned that this doctrine applies not only to 
convicted criminals who flee while an appeal is pending, but also to a noncitizen 
who “fails to comply with a notice to surrender for deportation.”65 
 
59. Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?  Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal 
Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 535 (2001).  Another example of a term 
in the INA whose meaning was developed at common law is entry.  Tellez v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 
1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that the definition of entry was developed at 
common law and explaining that the court’s interpretation of reentry under the INA 
reinstatement provision “does not disturb this longstanding common-law definition”). 
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2018) (requiring five years of “good moral character” preceding the 
naturalization application); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (defining the statutory bars to “good moral 
character”). 
61. In 1981, Congress eliminated the INA provision that prohibited adulterers from 
establishing good moral character.  Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, 
Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 2(c)(1), 95 Stat. 1611, 1611 (repealing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2) (1976)). 
62. Wishnie, supra note 59, at 535.  See also Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(rejecting reliance on Virginia antisodomy statute to interpret “good moral character” 
requirement for naturalization purposes); Moon Ho Kim v. INS, 514 F.2d 179, 181 (D.C. 
Cir. 1975) (rejecting reliance on varying state law definitions of “adultery” in interpreting 
“good moral character” under the INA, as this would “destroy any meaningful uniformity 
as to the definition of ‘adultery’ as used in the Congressional enactment”); Wadman v. INS, 
329 F.2d 812, 816–17 (9th Cir. 1964) (refusing to rely on a strict construction of California’s 
definition of “adultery” in interpreting this term for purposes of the INA’s “good moral 
character” requirement). 
63. See, e.g., In re Schroers, 336 F. Supp. 1348, 1349 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (“Uniformity . . . cannot be 
attained if resort is had to the laws of the 50 states to determine whether a particular 
applicant for citizenship has committed adultery.”).  But see Brea-Garcia v. INS, 531 F.2d 
693, 696–98 (3d Cir. 1976) (disagreeing with other decisions regarding the need for a 
uniform federal “adultery” definition in disregard of state law). 
64. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 97, 97–98 (1876) (holding that a court may 
dismiss a convicted fugitive’s criminal appeal); Kiran H. Griffith, Comment, Fugitives in 
Immigration: A Call for Legislative Guidelines on Disentitlement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 209, 
213–18 (2012) (discussing the origin and rationale behind the fugitive disentitlement 
doctrine). 
65. Gao v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 2007); see e.g., Giri v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 833, 835 
(5th Cir. 2007) (dismissing a noncitizen’s appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine); 
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The consular nonreviewability doctrine provides one last example of how 
courts have applied federal common law to immigration cases.  This doctrine 
precludes judicial review of consular decisions made by U.S. State Department 
officials at American consulates abroad.  The INA expressly limits judicial review 
of various types of immigration matters, but it does not so limit consular 
decisions.66  Rather, federal courts have developed this doctrine solely through 
cases dating back to the 1920s.67  While immigration scholars such as Stephen 
Legomsky have pointed out that arguments for the consular nonreviewability 
doctrine “were weak at the time they were advanced, and are superseded by the 
APA,” the doctrine remains alive and active today.68 
These examples of common law doctrines that are routinely raised in 
immigration cases show how courts have already recognized that the backdrop 
of common law shines through gaps in the INA.  Yet the BIA and federal courts 
have not yet adequately answered the question of whether federal common law 
defenses exist in removal proceedings.  Part II discusses several of these defenses, 
along with their applicability to both criminal and civil cases, including, in some 
 
Antonio-Martinez v. INS, 317 F.3d 1089, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2003) (exercising discretion not 
to dismiss an appeal under the fugitive disentitlement doctrine).  There is a circuit split 
regarding whether the fugitive disentitlement doctrine applies if a noncitizen fails to report 
to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) but his whereabouts are known to the 
court, counsel, and federal authorities.  See Griffith, supra note 64, at 211–12, 227–33. 
66. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2018) (limiting review of discretionary decisions).  
Consular decisions are not totally discretionary.  Consular officers must have “reason to 
believe” that the visa beneficiary falls within one of the inadmissibility categories defined by 
statute in order to deny a visa.  8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2018).  However, consular officers can 
make discretionary decisions about applications for inadmissibility waivers.  See, e.g., 
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769–70 (1972) (holding that courts will not look behind 
the Executive’s “facially legitimate and bona fide” exercise of discretion to exclude a 
noncitizen from the United States). 
67. See, e.g., Li Hing of H.K., Inc. v. Levin, 800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986) (showing the 
development of the consular nonreviewability doctrine through case law); Loza-Bedoya v. 
INS, 410 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984 (D.C. 
Cir. 1929); United States ex rel.London v. Phelps, 22 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1927); Licea-Gomez 
v. Pilliod, 193 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ill. 1960). 
68. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND 
AMERICA 150 (1987).  Appellate courts have recognized exceptions to the consular 
nonreviewability doctrine if the plaintiffs allege violations of their own constitutional rights 
along with their statutory claims, and if the plaintiffs challenge the government’s authority 
to take or not take an action, as opposed to a discretionary decision.  Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392, 2407 (2018) (noting that the Government relied on the consular 
nonreviewability doctrine in arguing that the Court could not review President Trump’s 
travel ban, but assuming, without deciding, that the Court could review the plaintiffs’ 
statutory claims); Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d by an 
equally divided court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (reasoning that the court had “an independent 
obligation to consider questions of statutory construction . . . in order to avoid a 
constitutional confrontation . . . .”). 
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instances, immigration cases.  Part III then argues that these defenses should 
apply in removal proceedings in at least a subset of cases. 
II. FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFENSES 
For hundreds of years, courts have recognized common law defenses to 
crimes.69  Although all federal crimes are statutory, common law defenses have 
been “routinely allowed against federal criminal prosecutions without explicit 
statutory basis.”70  Construing federal statutory crimes to include a mens rea 
requirement provides one example of this trend.  As Stephen Smith has 
explained, “the purpose and effect of reading mens rea requirements into 
criminal statutes is to create, on judicial initiative alone, a defense for persons 
lacking the state of mind deemed essential by the courts but not specifically 
required by Congress as a prerequisite for punishment.”71  In 1952, the Supreme 
Court construed the federal statutory crime of conversion to include an implicit 
mens rea requirement based on the common law tradition.72  The Court found 
“no grounds for inferring any affirmative action from Congress to eliminate 
intent” from the offense.73  In 1978, the Court again relied on common law 
principles in holding that the defendant’s state of mind is an element of a 
criminal antitrust offense under the Sherman Act of 1890.74  
More directly on point, in 1980, the Court decided United States v. Bailey,75 
which recognized an implicit common law necessity or duress defense for 
defendants charged with violating a federal statute that criminalized escaping 
from federal custody.76  The defendants in that case argued that their escape was 
 
69. See Benjamin Reeve, Note, Necessity: The Right to Present a Recognized Defense, 21 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 779, 781–84 (1985); see also Michelle R. Conde, Comment, Necessity Defined: 
A New Role in the Criminal Defense System, 29 UCLA L. REV. 409 (1981) (discussing the 
development of the necessity defense and arguing that it should have its own category as a 
hybrid justification/excuse defense); Glanville Williams, The Defence of Necessity, 6 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 216, 224 (1953) (chronicling the historical evolution of the necessity 
doctrine in English law). 
70. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 287 n.33 (1982); see also 
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (explaining that there are no 
federal common law crimes). 
71. Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 587 
(2013). 
72. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 272–73 (1952). 
73. Id. at 273. 
74. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 
435–46 (1978). 
75.   444 U.S. 394 (1980). 
76. Id. at 416 n.11 (recognizing that “a defense of duress or coercion may well have been 
contemplated by Congress when it enacted [18 U.S.C.] § 751(a)”). 
Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases 159 
necessary because of the prison conditions and death threats by guards.77  
Although the Court rejected the defense under the case’s facts, it recognized an 
implicit common law necessity or duress defense, stating that “Congress in 
enacting criminal statutes legislates against a background of Anglo-Saxon 
common law.”78  Subsequent decisions by federal appellate courts reinforced 
Bailey’s reasoning that common law defenses exist to statutory federal crimes.79 
In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative (Oakland 
Cannabis),80 which rejected a medical necessity exception for manufacturing and 
distributing marijuana, Justice Thomas’s majority opinion questioned whether 
federal courts have the authority to recognize common law defenses not provided 
by statute, calling this “an open question.”81  But that language was dicta, and three 
concurring justices challenged it, based on Bailey’s recognition of common law 
defenses to federal statutory crimes.82  Commentators also immediately criticized 
the majority opinion in Oakland Cannabis as “entirely unconvincing” insofar as it 
suggested that federal courts lack power to recognize a necessity defense.83  More 
recent articles demonstrate that federal courts routinely apply common law 
defenses in interpreting federal statutes.84  Numerous cases decided after Oakland 
 
77. Id. at 398–99. 
78. Id. at 415 n.11. 
79. For example, in 1984, the Ninth Circuit recognized necessity and duress defenses in a case 
involving a defendant who agreed to smuggle 129 balloons of cocaine from Colombia to the 
United States after a drug smuggler threatened to kill his wife and child if he did not 
cooperate.  United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723 F.2d 691, 693–95 (9th Cir. 1984).  In 
1988, the Supreme Court recognized a common law in pari delicto defense for actions under 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933.  Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988).  In 2000, the 
Third Circuit recognized a necessity defense in a case involving prosecution for being a felon 
in possession of a firearm, noting that courts have “engrafted” this “judge-made defense” 
onto the statute.  United States v. Dodd, 225 F.3d 340, 345 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that 
“[w]here courts have engrafted a traditional common-law defense onto a statute that itself 
is silent as to the applicability of traditional defenses, it is within the province of the courts 
to determine where the burden of proof on that defense is most appropriately placed”). 
80.   532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
81. Id. at 490. 
82. Id. at 499–503 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 
(1980)). 
83. Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 343, 354. 
84. See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079, 1105 (2017) (stating that “[T]raditional defenses such as duress, necessity, or self-
defense are routinely applied by federal courts, even though they’re uncodified in the federal 
system”); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and 
Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 752 (2013) (“[T]he typical federal statute that defines 
a crime does not explicitly address these generic [common law] defenses.  Nonetheless the 
Supreme Court has imported these defenses into federal criminal law entirely under the 
rubric of individual statutes.”).  But see Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful 
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Cannabis further confirm that courts recognize federal common law defenses to 
statutory crimes.85 
While common law defenses are generally thought of as criminal defenses, 
courts also apply them in civil cases.  For example, courts have recognized 
common law qualified immunity defenses in civil cases arising from a variety of 
federal statutes, including the Fair Housing Act,86 the Federal Wiretap Act,87 and 
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.88   
This Part discusses several common law defenses that may be relevant to 
removal proceedings, explaining how they are invoked in civil as well as criminal 
contexts.  These defenses are divided into three categories: justification defenses, 
which include necessity and self-defense; excuse defenses, which include duress, 
infancy, and insanity; and equitable defenses, which include entrapment by 
estoppel, equitable estoppel, and laches. 
 
Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109, 165 (2010) (doubting the validity of common law defenses to 
criminal statutes). 
85. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2006) (finding an implied duress defense 
under the Safe Streets Act); United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 492–93 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that self-defense is available in limited circumstances to inmates charged under 18 
U.S.C. § 111 for assaulting or resisting a correctional officer); United States v. Desinor, 525 
F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing “the law pertaining to self-defense” as “a matter of 
federal common law”). 
86. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (2018); see, e.g., Gonzalez v. Lee Cty. Hous. 
Auth., 161 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a qualified immunity defense exists for 
public officials under the Fair Housing Act). 
87. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2018)).  See Tapley v. Collins, 211 F.3d 1210, 1216 
(11th Cir. 2000) (holding that a qualified immunity defense remains under the Federal 
Wiretap Act because the statute lacks an explicit expression of intent to preclude it); Blake 
v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1012–13 (6th Cir. 1999) (same).  But see Berry v. Funk, 146 F.3d 
1003, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no qualified immunity defense under the 
Federal Wiretap Act because courts may not “graft common law defenses on top of those 
Congress creates”).  
88. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (holding that a judicial immunity defense remains under 
§ 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Eskridge, supra note 23, at 1053–
54 (discussing the public value behind the judicial immunity defense and its development 
in subsequent cases involving § 1983); David Achtenberg, Immunity Under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983: Interpretive Approach and the Search for the Legislative Will, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 497, 
500–01 (1992) (identifying five different approaches to interpreting the relevance of 
common law immunities in § 1983 cases).  In Filarksy v. Delia, the Supreme Court used a 
two-step approach for identifying the defenses under § 1983, which “begins with the 
common law as it existed when Congress passed § 1983 in 1871” and then asks whether 
anything specific to § 1983 “counsels against carrying forward the common law rule.”  132 
S. Ct. 1657, 1662–66 (2012). 
Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases 161 
A. Justification Defenses 
Justification defenses exculpate a person whose conduct would otherwise be 
criminal when special circumstances exist that render the conduct socially and 
morally acceptable.89  The principle of proportionality, which has deep roots in 
Anglo-American law, plays a key role in justification defenses.90  In this context, 
proportionality involves “balanc[ing] social benefits and harms” and considering 
“whether the actor’s response is commensurate with the circumstances which 
provoked it.”91  Necessity and self-defense are two justification defenses. 
1. Necessity 
The necessity defense initially appeared in civil admiralty cases from the 
early 1800s involving ships forced to port in places without following proper 
procedures because of inclement weather, leaks, or other problems.92  The 
Supreme Court did not apply the necessity defense to a criminal case until half a 
century later.93   
To satisfy the threshold requirements for a necessity defense, litigants 
must show that “(1) they were faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser 
evil; (2) they acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) they reasonably 
anticipated a direct causal relationship between their conduct and the harm 
 
89. See John L. Diamond, An Ideological Approach to Excuse in Criminal Law, 25 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3 (1999) (explaining that a justification defense means 
“[t]he actor has behaved properly, potentially for the public good, and there is no reason to 
criminalize his behavior”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Testing Competing Theories 
of Justification, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1998) (describing two theories that support the 
justification defense: that the person acts to “avoid greater harm” and that the person “acts 
for the right reason”). 
90. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284–86 (1983) (explaining that the Magna Carta expressed 
the principle of proportionality, and English courts applied it for centuries); JOSHUA 
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 221 (3d ed., LexisNexis 2001) (stating that 
justification defenses require proportionality). 
91. J. David Jacobs, Privileges for the Use of Deadly Force Against a Residence-Intruder: A 
Comparison of the Jewish Law and the United States Common Law, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 31, 33 
& n.15. (1990). 
92. See, e.g., Brig Struggle v. United States, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 71, 76 (1815) (finding insufficient 
evidence for the necessity defense where a ship violated certain commercial laws by making 
port in the West Indies without paying bond to the United States); Brig James Wells v. 
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 22, 25–26 (1812) (addressing the necessity defense in a 
case where a vessel made port in the West Indies, violating the Embargo Act of 1808, due to 
bad weather and a leaking vessel). 
93. See United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482, 486–87 (1868) (finding that it would be 
“absurd” to apply a law that prohibited “dr[awing] blood in the streets” to a surgeon who 
had “opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit”). 
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to be averted; and (4) they had no legal alternatives to violating the law.”94  
These elements are evaluated objectively from the perspective of a reasonable 
person.95 
A contemporary example of the necessity doctrine in civil cases is medical 
necessity.  In Raich v. Gonzales, seriously ill plaintiffs sought a declaration from 
the Ninth Circuit stating that medical necessity precludes enforcement of the 
Controlled Substances Act against them.  The court noted that Raich’s case 
“appears to satisfy the threshold requirements for asserting a necessity defense 
under our case law.”96  Ultimately, however, the court did not resolve this issue, 
because it concluded that Raich’s necessity claim would be “best resolved within 
the context of a specific prosecution under the Controlled Substances Act.”97 
Another modern form of the necessity defense is the business necessity 
defense in civil employment discrimination cases arising under Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the 
 
94. United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1991). 
95. Id. at 197–98. 
96. Raich v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 850, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2007), rev’g sub nom. Raich v. Ashcroft, 
248 F. Supp. 2d 918 (N.D. Cal. 2003), rev’d, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).  Relying on medical evidence 
that Raich would suffer debilitating pains, deteriorate quickly, and possibly die without 
using medical marijuana, the court found that she chose the lesser evil by violating the 
Controlled Substances Act.  Id. at 859–60.  Next, the court found that she was acting to stop 
imminent harm because her acute chronic pain and wasting disorders would immediately 
resume if she stopped using marijuana.  Id. at 860.  Third, the court found a causal 
connection between her physical condition and her need to use marijuana based on her 
physician’s testimony.  Id.  Finally, the court found no legal alternatives to violating the law 
because Raich’s physician testified that all other alternative medications had been ineffective 
or resulted in intolerable side effects.  Id. 
97. Id. at 860. 
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Americans with Disabilities Act.98  Litigants have also invoked the necessity 
defense in civil cases brought under the Federal Torts Claims Act.99 
2. Self-Defense 
Self-defense is a justification defense that has been firmly ingrained in U.S. 
law since the nineteenth century.100  Citing Blackstone and nineteenth century 
 
98. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659–60 (1989) (explaining that, 
in Title VII employment discrimination cases based on disparate impact, the employer 
carries the burden of producing business-necessity evidence, but the burden of persuasion 
remains with the plaintiff); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 n.14 (1977) (holding 
that physical requirements for prison guards with a disparate impact on women “must be 
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 427, 432 (1971) (explaining that Title VII “proscribes not only overt 
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation,” and 
stating that the defendant must show that an employment requirement “[has] a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question” to establish the business necessity defense); 
EEOC v. UPS, 306 F.3d 794, 804 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the business necessity defense 
in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act), amended by 311 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 
2002) (denying rehearing en banc); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the business necessity defense in the context of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621–634); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 1044 Stat. 
327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
99. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946) (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b), §§ 2671–2680 (2018)); see, e.g., Russ v. United States, 62 F.3d 201, 202–04 
(7th Cir. 1995) (affirming the trial court’s decision rejecting a Federal Tort Claims Act claim 
brought by a patient at a Veterans Administration hospital, because the use of force to 
restrain the patient was justified by necessity); Hinojosa v. City of Terrell, 834 F.2d 1223, 
1231 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Although limited to ‘necessary’ situations, a police officer is also 
privileged even to use actual force against a person in the performance of his duties as an 
officer.”); see also Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal 
System: Beyond Contempt, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 491, 522–24 (1989). 
100. See Scribner v. Beach, 4 Denio 448, 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847) (describing self-defense as a 
“primary law of nature”).  Some scholars have characterized self-defense as an innate or 
natural right.  See, e.g., Shlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of 
Forced Consequences, 91 VA. L. REV. 999, 1027 (2005) (“Starting from the premise of an 
absolute unqualified right not to be killed, it follows that self-defense, as a derivative right, 
must be an absolute natural right as well.”).  Others argue that it is a constitutional right.  For 
arguments that the self-defense doctrine derives from the Second Amendment, see, for 
example, Alan Brownstein, The Constitutionalization of Self-Defense in Tort and Criminal 
Law, Grammatically-Correct Originalism, and Other Second Amendment Musings, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1205, 1231 (2009); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Second Amendment Penumbras: 
Some Preliminary Observations, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 257 (2012).  For arguments that there 
is a constitutional right to self-defense independent of the Second Amendment, see, for 
example, Jason T. Anderson, Note, Second Amendment Standard of Review: What the 
Supreme Court Left Unanswered in District of Columbia v. Heller, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 585 
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cases, one federal court explained that “the modern rule of self-defense, as it 
presently applies to criminal and civil cases, is not of constitutional origin, but 
rather comes to us through our inheritance of English common law.”101  Under 
the Model Penal Code, the elements required to establish self-defense in a 
criminal case are (1) a reasonable belief of imminent danger of physical harm; 
(2) the use of force must be necessary to prevent the harm; and (3) no more force 
than necessary was used to defend against the harm.102 
However, some courts apply a different test, reasoning that federal 
common law requires a party claiming self-defense to show (1) that he was under 
an unlawful, imminent, and impending threat of death or serious bodily injury; 
(2) that he had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in such a  situation; 
(3) that he had no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) that a 
direct causal relationship would have been reasonably anticipated between the 
criminal action taken and the avoidance of the threatened harm.103  This test was 
applied by the Tenth and Second Circuits in the criminal context and then 
adopted by Bankruptcy Courts in the civil context.104  Additionally, civil 
common law tort actions such as negligence and battery may involve self-
defense claims.105  In her article on the self-defense and mistake defenses in 
 
(2009); Anders Kaye, Comment, Dangerous Places: The Right to Self-Defense in Prison and 
Prison Conditions Jurisprudence, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 693, 709–10 (1996) (arguing that 
prisoners have a constitutional right to self-defense). 
101. Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc. v. Van de Kamp, 746 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (E.D. Cal. 1990). 
102. Model Penal Code § 3.04 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1390 (8th ed. 2004); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 491 (3d ed. 2000); see 
also Martin E. Veinsreideris, The Prospective Effects of Modifying Existing Law to 
Accommodate Preemptive Self-Defense by Battered Women, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 615 
(2000) (surveying self-defense statutes from multiple jurisdictions and concluding that the 
basic self-defense principles are the same, albeit with “seemingly infinite linguistic 
variations”). 
103. See United States v. Desinor, 525 F.3d 193, 198–200 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Butler, 
485 F.3d 569, 572 (10th Cir. 2007). 
104. See In re Greene, 397 B.R. 688, 695 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing United States v. Desinor, 
525 F.3d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 2008), and United States v. Butler, 495 F.3d 569, 572 (10th Cir. 
2007)); see also In re Soliman, 539 B.R. 692, 701 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting In re 
Greene, 397 B.R. 688).  Self-defense comes up in bankruptcy cases involving a claim that a 
debt is nondischargeable because of willful and malicious injury.  For example, in a case in 
which a debtor stabbed a creditor, the creditor claimed that the debt was nondischargeable 
owing to a willful and malicious injury, and the debtor argued self-defense.  In re Greene, 
397 B.R. 688. 
105. See, e.g., Williams v. Papi, 30 F. Supp. 3d 306, 316 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“Th[is] citation [is to 
a] criminal case[ ], but the law governing the right of self-defense in civil cases is much the 
same.” (quoting Kitay v. Halpern, 105 Pa. Super. 167, 158 A. 309, 310 (1932)); Murphy v. 
Bitsoih, 320 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1203 (2004) (stating that “the Court will evaluate Defendants’ 
conduct under the general civil law of self-defense and defense of others”; noting that “[i]n 
a civil case, the New Mexico Supreme Court explained, ‘[T]o justify . . . battery . . . on the 
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criminal and tort law, Caroline Forell notes that “[t]here are few, if any, 
substantive distinctions between civil and criminal law with regard to the 
prerequisites to justification of a claim of self-defense.”106  Self-defense is also 
relevant to civil rights cases based on statutory and constitutional claims.107  
B. Excuse Defenses 
Unlike justification defenses, excuse defenses do not involve a claim that 
the individual acted appropriately under the circumstances.108  Rather, an 
individual who raises an excuse defense admits doing the wrong thing but 
contends that some aspect of her condition makes her not culpable.109  In other 
words, the person is not to blame because of her individual level of self-control 
 
ground of self-defense, the person assaulted must have done some overt act or made a hostile 
demonstration of a character to give the assailant reasonable ground to suppose himself in 
imminent danger’”; and clarifying that “There is the further limitation that only such force 
may be used as a reasonably prudent [person] under the circumstances would believe 
necessary to repel the assault.”(citing Faubion v. Tucker, 58 N.M. 303, 306 (1954))); 
Thompson v. Petit, 691 N.E.2d 860, 864 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that “Illinois recognizes 
the doctrine of self-defense as a defense both in criminal and civil cases” in a negligence 
action brought by a plaintiff to recover damages from a defendant who shot him during a 
traffic altercation). 
106. See, e.g., Caroline Forell, Symposium, What’s Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in 
Criminal and Tort Law, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1401, 1403 (2010); see also 33 AM. JUR. 2D 
Proof of Facts § 1 (2018). 
107. See, e.g., Smith v. Hill, 741 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that a federal drug agent 
acted reasonably under the circumstances when he shot a drug dealer to death in self-
defense and thus was not liable for violations of the dealer’s civil rights); Fernandez v. 
Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1213–14 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that defendant FBI officer was not 
entitled to absolute immunity and denying his motion for summary judgment on 
constitutional claims where “it could be found that defendant did not act in self-defense, 
mistakenly or otherwise” in shooting an unarmed kidnap victim); Grisom v. Logan, 334 F. 
Supp. 273, 279 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (applying the same self-defense standard in civil rights 
claims as in tort).  When a plaintiff brings a lawsuit under § 1983, claiming excessive force 
by an officer in the course of an arrest, however, some courts have held that the burden of 
self-defense should not be placed on the defendant but on the plaintiff as part of establishing 
excessive force.  See Wing v. Britton, 748 F.2d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 1984). 
108. See Diamond, supra note 89, at 3. 
109. Robinson & Darley, supra note 89, at 1097.  While this is the simplest explanation of the 
difference, scholars have long debated the distinctions between justification and excuse.  See 
Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A 
Critique of Fletcher’s Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984); George P. 
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985); Kent Greenawalt, 
Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 89 (1986); Kent 
Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 
(1984); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for 
Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266 (1975). 
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or inability to make a meaningful choice.110  Duress and lack of capacity, which 
includes infancy (also called immaturity) and insanity, are two excuse defenses 
discussed here.111 
1. Duress 
The duress defense, like the necessity defense, has deep roots in the 
common law.112  The First, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a 
three-part test for duress that requires showing “(1) imminent threat of death or 
grave bodily harm; (2) well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and 
(3) no reasonable opportunity to escape.”113  The Third Circuit has added a 
fourth element to this test, at least in the criminal context, requiring the 
defendant to show that he had not “recklessly placed himself in a situation where 
he would be forced to engage in criminal conduct.”114  Similarly, the Eleventh 
 
110. See, e.g., D. Michael Bitz & Jean Seipp Bitz, Incompetence in the Brain Injured Individual, 12 
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 205, 274 (1999) (“Historical perspectives show that civilized societies 
have almost universally attempted to determine the true culpability of an individual’s action 
prior to assessing the appropriate degree of responsibility.”). 
111. Whether duress should be classified as an excuse defense or justification defense is subject 
to debate, but I group it as an excuse defense because that has traditionally been its 
classification under U.S. law.  Some commentators have argued that duress should be 
classified as a justification defense when it permits acting to protect another person’s, not 
just the defendant’s own, life.  See Noam Wiener, Excuses, Justifications, and Duress at the 
International Criminal Tribunals, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 88, 130 (2014).  Weiner states: “By 
removing the requirement that the person acting under duress is himself threatened, the 
central element that creates the lack of free will is removed from the definition of the 
defense.”  Id.  He further writes: “Because the central element of the defense is no longer the 
inability of the defendant to freely exercise his free will due to grave personal risk, the defense 
is no longer an excuse, but rather a justification. . . .  [O]nce duress is treated as a 
justification, inserting a proportionality requirement is necessary.”  Id.  Monu Bedi, 
Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of Duress and Necessity 
Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575 (2011) (arguing that both 
duress and necessity should be classified as excuses based on the victim’s role).  See also Peter 
Westen & James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress: A Justification, Not an 
Excuse—and Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 945–46 (2003). 
112. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 (2006) (discussing the duress defense’s origins). 
113. United States v. Charmley, 764 F.2d 675, 676 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that “[a] fourth element 
ordinarily relevant only in prison escape cases, viz., prompt surrender to authorities upon 
reaching a place of safety . . . is a factor the court may nevertheless consider in assessing the 
escapability prong of the duress test”); see also United States v. Nwoye, 824 F.3d 1129, 1135, 
1137 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (describing the test as two parts but explaining that under the first 
prong, the defendant must have acted under the influence of a reasonable fear of imminent 
death or serious bodily injury); United States v. Jocic, 207 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Arthurs, 73 F.3d 444, 448 (1st Cir. 1996). 
114. United States v. Paolello, 951 F.2d 537, 541 (3d Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Miller, 59 
F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1995). 
Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases 167 
Circuit requires the defendant to show that he had not “recklessly or negligently 
placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subject to 
duress.”115 
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have also adopted a four-
part test with the same basic elements for duress, although they are phrased 
slightly differently, requiring (1) an imminent threat of death or serious bodily 
injury; (2) that the defendant did not recklessly or negligently place himself in a 
situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the criminal 
conduct; (3) no reasonable, legal alternative to violating the law; and (4) that a 
direct causal relationship may be reasonably anticipated between the action 
taken and the avoidance of the harm.116  Here, the last element requiring a direct 
causal relationship replaces the well-grounded fear element.  The Sixth Circuit 
appears to be the only circuit that has added a fifth element to the test for duress, 
requiring the defendant to also show that he “did not maintain the illegal 
conduct any longer than absolutely necessary.”117 
The circuit split on the correct legal test for duress has not been resolved by 
the Supreme Court.  In Dixon v. United States,118 the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that it had “not specified the elements of the [duress] defense,” 
but declined to do so in that case.119  Instead, the court “presumed the accuracy” 
of the district court’s description of the duress elements, which was the four-part 
test adopted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.120 
Although the duress defense is often associated with criminal cases, it 
originally appeared in civil cases.  In a contract case from 1868 involving a 
dispute over land, the Supreme Court defined duress as “that degree of 
constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, 
which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome the mind and will 
of a person of ordinary firmness.”121  Litigants also invoke the common law 
duress defense in a variety of other types of civil cases, such as civil tax fraud, civil 
contempt, and carrier fines.122  In addition, courts have accepted the duress 
 
115. United States v. Blanco, 754 F.2d 940, 943 (11th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added). 
116. United States v. Lomax, 87 F.3d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Crittendon, 883 
F.2d 326, 330 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Harper, 802 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667 (2d Cir. 1979). 
117. United States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 
118. 548 U.S. 1 (2006). 
119. United States v. Dixon, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
120. Id. 
121. Brown v. Pierce, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 214 (1868). 
122. Theodore Roethke, American Law and the Problem of Coerced Provision of Support to a 
Terrorist Organization as Grounds for Removal, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 173, 187–91 
(2007). 
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defense in civil RICO123 cases and civil enforcement actions brought by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Investment Advisers 
Act’s124 antifraud provisions.125  In federal breach of contract cases, the Federal 
Circuit has applied a three-part test to determine whether a contract is 
unenforceable because of duress.  The test requires showing “(1) that [a party] 
involuntarily accepted the other party’s terms; (2) that circumstances permitted 
no other alternative, and (3) that such circumstances were the result of the other 
party’s coercive acts.”126 
Federal courts have also addressed whether the duress defense applies to 8 
U.S.C. § 1323, an INA provision that imposes civil penalties on fishing vessels for 
illegally bringing noncitizens into the United States.  In several cases involving 
fishing vessels that illegally transported Cubans to the United States during the 
Cuban boatlift of 1980, the Eleventh Circuit determined that duress or coercion 
could be raised as a defense to the imposition of fines under the INA.127  Although 
the BIA had refused to recognize duress as a defense, stating that the relevant 
statutory provision is a strict liability statute and that fines are imposed without 
regard to the vessel owners’ intentions, the Eleventh Circuit rejected that 
interpretation.128  The court allowed the duress defense, requiring the same 
elements as in criminal cases.129 
Most recently, the BIA recognized a duress defense to the INA’s statutory 
bar against asylum and withholding of removal for individuals who have 
persecuted others.  In Matter of Negusie, a case that had been remanded by the 
Supreme Court in 2009 but was not decided by the BIA until 2018, the BIA 
applied a five-part test for duress.130  In addition to adopting the four elements of 
 
123. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 
941 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2018)). 
124. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2018)). 
125. See, e.g., MCM Partners, Inc. v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 967, 980 (7th Cir. 
1995) (recognizing the duress defense in a civil RICO case); SEC v. Illarramendi, 260 F. 
Supp. 3d 166 (D. Conn. 2017) (recognizing the duress defense in a case brought under the 
Investment Advisers Act’s antifraud provisions). 
126. N. Star Steel Co. v. United States, 477 F.3d 1324, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
127. See Pollgreen v. Morris, 770 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Blanco, 754 
F.2d 940, 942–43 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Sanchez, 520 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (S.D. 
Fla. 1981), aff’d 703 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1983), and reh’g denied, 709 F.2d 1353 (11th Cir. 
1983) (all holding that duress or coercion may be raised as a defense to the imposition of 
fines under the INA for bringing undocumented Cubans to Florida during the “Freedom 
Flotilla” or “Mariel boatlift”). 
128. Pollgreen, 770 F.2d at 1543–44. 
129. Id. at 1544–45. 
130. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
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the test that the Supreme Court had “presumed” to be accurate in United States 
v. Dixon, the BIA added a proportionality element, requiring the noncitizen to 
show that he “knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he inflicted 
was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or others.”131  In a footnote, 
the BIA acknowledged that the concept of proportionality is historically 
associated with the necessity defense in the United States, rather than the duress 
defense.132  Soon after the BIA issued its decision, however, Attorney General 
Sessions certified the case to himself, suggesting that he may overrule the BIA 
and find no duress defense to the persecutor bar.133 
2. Lack of Capacity: Infancy and Insanity 
The infancy defense and the insanity defense have to do with capacity, 
which refers to the ability to appreciate an act’s wrongfulness.134  The infancy 
defense existed at common law as early as Edward III’s reign and was accepted as 
part of U.S. common law in the nineteenth century.135  Some scholars have 
viewed the infancy defense “as an aspect of mens rea in its general sense,” an 
inability to appreciate “one’s moral blameworthiness.”136  In other words, a child 
may be too immature to form the requisite intent.  Others, however, have 
stressed that despite the overlap between these concepts, there are crucial 
differences between an infancy defense and a mens rea requirement.  While the 
inquiry into mens rea “assume[s] the capacity to be culpable,” the infancy 
defense is “a critique of the possibility of intentional behavior.”137 
Courts have applied the common law infancy defense not only to criminal 
cases, but also to civil cases as far back as the 1800s.  For example, contracts entered 
 
131. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363–64. 
132. Id. at 364 n.20. 
133. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (B.I.A. 2018) (inviting the parties and amici to submit briefing 
on “[w]hether coercion and duress are relevant to the application of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s persecutor bar”). 
134. See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility in Juvenile 
Delinquency Proceedings, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 181, 183–85 (1977). 
135. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 22–24 (8th ed 1778); see 
also Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54 
U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 708–14 (2006) (discussing the infancy defense’s history under English 
and early American common law). 
136. Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile Court 
Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 176 (1993). 
137. Andrew Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 UCLA L. REV. 503, 
551 (1984). 
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into by children were treated as void ab initio.138  Some courts have also applied the 
infancy defense to juvenile adjudications, which are technically civil proceedings.  
While many courts have relied on the “rehabilitative ideal” of juvenile 
adjudications in denying use of the infancy defense, courts with a “more realistic 
vision” of juvenile adjudications’ quasicriminal nature have allowed the infancy 
defense in certain cases.139  The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), which 
provides a civil procedure for the treatment of juveniles who committed an act that 
violated federal law, does not explicitly preclude or allow an infancy defense.140 
The insanity defense in criminal cases dates back to medieval times.141  
Courts and commentators in the eighteenth century compared insanity to 
infancy.  In a famous jury instruction from 1724, Justice Tracy asked the jury to 
determine whether the defendant was “totally deprived of his understanding and 
memory, and doth not know what he is doing, no more than an infant, than a 
brute, or a wild beast.”142 
In 1843, the House of Lords crafted the M’Naghten test as the means of 
determining whether a criminal defendant should be excused from his crime 
because of insanity.  For a person to have availed himself of this defense, he 
needed to prove that, at the time he committed the act, he “was laboring under 
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
equality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was 
 
138. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882) (“[I]nfancy, if a valid defense by the 
lex loci contractus [the law of the place where the contract is made or is to be performed], 
will be a valid defense everywhere.”); Vent v. Osgood, 36 Mass. 572, 575 (19 Pick.) (1837); 
Richard A. Epstein, Symposium, Living Dangerously: A Defense of Mortal Peril, 1998 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 909, 910  (noting “the common-law defenses of duress, fraud, infancy, and 
incompetence” to contracts); cf. A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, 562 F.3d 630, 
636 n.5 (4th Cir. 2009) (noting, in a case brought by four high students against a company 
that owned and operated a technology system used by schools to detect plagiarism, that the 
district court refused to void the contract based on the infancy doctrine, reasoning that the 
plaintiffs could not use this doctrine as a “‘sword’ to void a contract while retaining the 
contract’s benefits—high school credit and standing to bring this action” (quoting 5 
RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 9.14 (4th ed. 1990))). 
139. Walkover, supra note 137, at 549–54 (citing In re Andrew M., 398 N.Y.S.2d 824 (Fam. Ct. 
1977); In re Gladys R., 464 P.2d 127 (Cal. 1970) (en banc); and Commonwealth v. Durham, 
389 A.2d 108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)). 
140. Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–5042 (2012). 
141. See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in 
Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1208 (2000). 
142. Rex v. Arnold (1724) 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764–65; see also MATTHEW HALE, 1 HISTORIA 
PLACITORUM CORONÆ: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 30 (1736) (explaining that 
the insanity defense required the absence of “understanding and will” akin to a child’s 
mental state); 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 135, at 24–25 (requiring “total idiocy, or absolute 
insanity” to establish an insanity defense). 
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doing what was wrong.”143  Although the M’Naghten test has evolved over time, 
federal courts and most states use different versions of that rule today.144  Only 
four states have legislatively abolished the insanity defense and replaced it with a 
mens rea approach.145 
While insanity has only rarely been recognized as a defense in civil cases, it 
is not without precedent.  For example, some courts have recognized insanity as 
a defense to civil damages in assault cases;146 as a defense to torts in special 
circumstances, such as when institutionalized individuals with mental 
disabilities who are unable to control or appreciate the consequences of their 
conduct injure caretakers who are employed for financial compensation;147 as a 
defense to civil tax fraud;148 and in cases involving life insurance policies that 
exclude coverage for losses caused by intentional acts such as suicide.149 
C. Equitable Defenses 
Equitable defenses are affirmative defenses based on the inequitable or 
unfair conduct of the party bringing the lawsuit.  Historically, the English 
Chancellor “entertained defenses to equitable relief that common-law judges 
would not accept as defenses to claims for money damages in the courts of 
law.”150  In modern times, law and equity have merged, with the same judges 
 
143. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). 
144. See Slobogin, supra note 141, at 1209–14. 
145. Id. at 1200 n.2, 1214.  The states that have abolished the insanity defense are Idaho, Kansas, 
Utah, and Montana.  See IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 46-14-214 (1999). Nevada’s 
legislature abolished the insanity defense in 1995, but the Nevada Supreme Court held that 
it was constitutionally required in 2001. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (1997); Finger v. 
State, 27 P.3d 66, 86 (Nev. 2001) (holding that the abolition of the insanity defense violated 
due process), cert denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002). 
146. See Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 294 A.2d 338, 339 (Conn. Ct. Com. Pl. 1972). 
147. See Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 282 (Wis. 1996). 
148. See Hollman v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 251 (1962); see also Kenneth G. Anderson, Insanity as a 
Defense to the Civil Fraud Penalty, 1963 DUKE L.J. 428 (1963). 
149. See Stanley R. Kern, “Insanity” in Civil Law, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1159 (1986); see also Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 591 (1872).  Kern writes: 
 If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that 
his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired 
that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences, 
and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane 
impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation 
of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable. 
 Id.; see also Ruvolo v. Am. Cas. Co., 189 A.2d 204, 208 (N.J. 1963) (explaining that “if the 
actor does not have the mental capacity to do the act intentionally, the [insurance] policy 
coverage remains operative”). 
150. Edward Yorio, A Defense of Equitable Defenses, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1205–06 (1990). 
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deciding both types of claims.151  Equitable defenses can be based on improper 
conduct by one party, delay in bringing an action, mistake, and other factors.  An 
important characteristic of equitable defenses is that they give judges the 
flexibility “to shape the remedy to fit the facts of the particular case.”152  The 
equitable defenses discussed here include entrapment by estoppel and its civil 
counterpart, equitable estoppel, as well as laches. 
1. Entrapment by Estoppel and Equitable Estoppel 
Entrapment by estoppel has a misleading name because it has nothing to 
do with entrapment.  It applies when a government official erroneously assures 
a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on 
that advice in committing an unlawful act.153  Since the defense is concerned with 
reliance on wrong information about the law, it is related to due process 
concerns about fair notice.154  Although entrapment by estoppel is generally 
raised as a defense in criminal proceedings, the Seventh Circuit has reasoned that 
“it does not follow that the defense is irrelevant in civil proceedings.”155  The Sixth 
Circuit has also recognized this defense’s applicability to both criminal and civil 
proceedings, noting that the burden for establishing the defense is a 
preponderance of the evidence.156 
Some courts have found that entrapment by estoppel is equitable estoppel’s 
civil law counterpart.  Equitable estoppel may be a defense if the defendant 
justifiably relies on misrepresentations by the plaintiff and is harmed by that 
reliance.  In civil actions arising under federal law, courts have explained that the 
federal common law of equitable estoppel applies rather than state law.157  
 
151. Id. at 1206. 
152. Id. at 1229. 
153. United States v. Achter, 52 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1995).  The Eleventh Circuit also notes: 
 Entrapment-by-estoppel is an affirmative defense that provides a narrow exception to 
the general rule that ignorance of the law is no defense.  To assert this defense 
successfully, a defendant must actually rely on a point of law misrepresented by an 
official of the state; and such reliance must be objectively reasonable—given the identity 
of the official, the point of law represented, and the substance of the misrepresentation. 
 United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Mary D. Fan, 
Legalization Conflicts and Reliance Defenses, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 907, 944–45 (2015) 
(discussing the “entrapment by estoppel” defense and distinguishing it from an entrapment 
defense). 
154. See Fan, supra note 153, at 943. 
155. Keathley v. Holder, 696 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2012). 
156. See United States v. Beaty, 245 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Stewart, 
185 F.3d 112, 124 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1063 (1999)). 
157. Audit Servs., Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757, 762 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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The Supreme Court has never applied equitable estoppel against the 
government, which creates a challenge to invoking equitable estoppel as a 
defense in immigration cases.158  Yet the Court has not ruled out that possibility 
either.159  In Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc.,160 
the Court left open the question of whether estoppel may lie against the 
government, but clarified that a litigant would need to demonstrate “the 
traditional elements of estoppel,” as well as affirmative misconduct.161 
The Supreme Court has similarly declined to resolve the question of 
whether estoppel may lie against the government immigration cases.  In INS v. 
Hibi,162 a Filipino immigrant who had served in the U.S. Army during World 
War II argued that the government was estopped from claiming he was too late 
to file for naturalization under the Nationality Act of 1940.163  That Act allowed 
noncitizens who had served in the Armed Forces to naturalize without meeting 
certain literacy and residency requirements if they filed their applications by 
December 31, 1946.164  His estoppel claim was based on the government’s failure 
to advise him of his rights.  The Supreme Court rejected this estoppel argument, 
finding that Hibi failed to show “affirmative misconduct,” but left open the 
possibility of an estoppel claim against the government.165  Subsequently, in INS 
v. Miranda, the Court again declined to reach the question of “whether 
affirmative misconduct in a particular case would estop the Government from 
enforcing the immigration laws.”166  The Court simply concluded that an 
 
158. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917) (“[I]t is enough 
to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by the acts of its officers or agents 
in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does 
not sanction or permit.”). 
159. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 422 (1990) (“Courts of Appeals have 
taken our statements as an invitation to search for an appropriate case in which to apply 
estoppel against the Government, yet we have reversed every finding of estoppel that we 
have reviewed.”); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 315 (1961) (“[W]e need not stop to 
inquire whether, as some lower courts have held, there may be circumstances in which the 
United States is estopped to deny citizenship because of the conduct of its officials.”). 
160.   467 U.S. 51 (1984). 
161. Id. at 60–61. 
162.   414 U.S. 6 (1973) 
163. Id.; Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (repealed 1952). 
164. Nationality Act of 1940 § 702. 
165. Hibi, 414 U.S. at 8–9; see also Tom F. Veldman, Estopping the Government in Immigration 
Cases: The Immigration Estoppel Light Remains Cautionary Yellow, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
731, 732–39 (1981) (arguing that “courts of appeals have inconsistently defined and applied” 
the affirmative misconduct standard in Hibi). 
166. INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982). 
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eighteen-month delay in considering a spousal visa application “falls far short of 
establishing such conduct.”167 
Although the Supreme Court has not clearly stated that estoppel may lie 
against the government, federal appellate courts have recognized it as a defense in 
immigration cases.168  While courts have defined equitable estoppel’s elements in 
this context slightly differently, they all require affirmative misconduct and 
reasonable reliance to the noncitizen’s detriment.169  In a decision from the 1970s, 
the Second Circuit found that the government was equitably estopped from 
deporting a noncitizen based on the State Department’s failure to warn her of 
certain visa requirements, finding this failure to be “fully as misleading” and “at 
least as severe as an act of affirmative misconduct.”170  But the court advised that its 
decision was “limited to the extraordinary circumstances before [it].”171  In more 
recent cases, the Second Circuit has explained that “[t]he doctrine of equitable 
estoppel against the government has narrowed substantially,”172 and that it is 
available only “in the most serious of circumstances” and must be “applied with 
the utmost caution and restraint.”173 
 
167. Id.; see also Heckler , 467 U.S. at 51. 
168. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 830 F.3d 179, 181–82 (5th Cir. 2016); Ahmed v. Holder, 624 F.3d 
150, 155 (2d Cir. 2010); Mejia-Perez v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 2007); 
Mudric v. Attorney Gen. of United States., 469 F.3d 94, 99 (3d Cir. 2006); Gutierrez v. 
Gonzales, 458 F.3d 688, 691–94 (7th Cir. 2006); Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158, 
1166 (9th Cir. 2005); Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004); 
Kowalczyk v. INS, 245 F.3d 1143, 1150 (10th Cir. 2001); Westover v. Reno, 202 F.3d 475, 481 
(1st Cir. 2000) (considering and rejecting an equitable estoppel claim); Stone v. INS, 13 F.3d 
934, 939 (6th Cir. 1994). 
169. See, e.g., Mudric, 469 F.3d at 99 (explaining that to prevail on an equitable estoppel claim, 
the noncitizen must establish a misrepresentation on which he reasonably relied to his 
detriment, as well as affirmative misconduct); Salgado-Diaz, 395 F.3d at 1166 (stating that 
equitable estoppel’s traditional elements require showing that “(1) the party to be estopped 
knows the facts; (2) the party intends that his or her conduct will be acted on; (3) the claimant 
must be ignorant of the true facts; (4) and the claimant must detrimentally rely on the other 
party’s conduct”); Costa v. INS, 233 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2000) (“A private party who presses 
for an estoppel against the government must establish (1) the occurrence of affirmative 
government misconduct (2) engendering a reasonable (though erroneous) belief that a 
certain state of affairs exists (3) upon which the private party relies to his detriment.”); 
Mejia-Perez, 490 F.3d at 1012 (“In order to establish a claim of equitable estoppel against the 
government, Mejia-Perez must prove: (1) a false representation by the government; (2) the 
government’s intent to induce Mejia-Perez to act on the misrepresentation; (3) Mejia-
Perez’s lack of knowledge or inability to obtain the true facts; (4) Mejia-Perez’s detrimental 
reliance; and (5) affirmative misconduct by the government.”). 
170. Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1976). 
171. Id. at 307 n.18. 
172. Ahmed v. Holder, 624 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2010). 
173. Rojas-Ryes v. INS, 235 F.3d 115, 126 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted). 
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The Ninth Circuit has also found equitable estoppel against the 
government in the immigration context.  A case from 1976 involved a long, 
unexplained delay in processing a labor certification, which the court called 
“affirmative inaction.”174  More recently, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
government should be equitably estopped from relying on a noncitizen’s illegal 
reentry to deport him when the deportation preceding the reentry was 
wrongful.175 
Yet, despite these appellate court decisions dating back to the 1970s that 
recognize estoppel claims against the government in immigration cases, the BIA 
has expressed uncertainty about whether equitable estoppel may be raised as a 
defense in the deportation context.176  In some situations, the BIA has assumed 
arguendo that a noncitizen can make an equitable estoppel defense against the 
government, but in those cases it always concluded that the individual did not 
establish estoppel’s elements, which it defined as affirmative misconduct, 
reasonable reliance, and prejudice.177 
2. Laches 
Laches is an equitable defense developed at common law that provides a 
mechanism for a court to dismiss a case if there is unreasonable, prejudicial delay 
in commencing a suit.178  It normally applies when Congress has not provided 
any statute of limitations.179  As the Seventh Circuit explained, “When Congress 
fails to enact a statute of limitations, a [federal] court that borrows a state statute 
of limitations but permits it to be abridged by the doctrine of laches is not 
invading congressional prerogatives.  It is merely filling a legislative hole.”180  
 
174. Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1976). 
175. Salgado-Diaz v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005). 
176. Tuakoi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 341, 348 (B.I.A. 1985) (“It has not been determined that estoppel will 
lie against the Government in immigration cases.”); Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. 453, 456 
(B.I.A. 1987) (“[I]t is not clear that estoppel will lie against the Government in immigration 
cases.”). 
177. Tuakoi, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 348; Hosseinian, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 456–57. 
178. See 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.4(4), at 103 (2d ed., West Pub Co. 1993) 
(“Laches . . . may have originated in equity because no statute of limitations 
applied, . . . suggest[ing] that laches should be limited to cases in which no statute of limitations 
applies.”). 
179. See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394–95 (1946) (“If Congress explicitly puts 
a limit upon the time for enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter.”); 
United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935) (“Laches within the term of the statute of 
limitations is no defense [to an action] at law.”). 
180. Teamsters & Emp’rs Welfare Tr. v. Gorman Bros. Ready Mix, 283 F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 
2002) (internal citation omitted). 
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Laches has been raised as a defense in many types of civil cases, including 
copyright suits,181 patent infringement actions,182 and disputes over land.183  
Establishing the laches defense generally requires showing “(1) lack of diligence 
by the party against whom the defense is asserted, and (2) prejudice to the party 
asserting the defense.”184 
When the United States brings an action, however, laches is only available 
as a defense in very limited circumstances.  Such circumstances could involve a 
particularly egregious delay or the United States’s pursuit of a private interest 
rather than a public right or interest.185  In Costello v. United States, the Supreme 
Court noted that it has consistently adhered to “the principle that laches is not a 
defense against the sovereign,” but the Court went on to comment that it had not 
“considered the question of the application of laches in a denaturalization 
proceeding.”186  Instead of deciding whether laches applied in the 
denaturalization context, the Court simply concluded that “even if we assume 
the applicability of laches . . . the petitioner failed to prove both of the elements 
which are necessary to the recognition of the defense.”187  
Several lower courts have similarly found it more expedient to dispose of a 
laches claim on its merits than to decide its applicability to denaturalization 
proceedings.188  The BIA also followed this approach in a case involving a delay 
 
181. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014). 
182. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954 (2017). 
183. Cayuga Indian Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005) (involving a 200-year delay). 
184. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 282 (1961). 
185. See United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1995). 
186. Costello, 365 U.S. at 281–82 (discussing denaturalization under the INA, which at that time 
was codified at 8 U.S.C. § 340(a) (1952), as well as its statutory predecessor, 8 U.S.C. § 738 
(1948)). 
187. Id. at 282. 
188. See United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2007) (“It remains an open 
question in this circuit as to whether laches is a permissible defense to a denaturalization 
proceeding . . . .  As in Costello, we hold that even assuming that laches is a permissible 
defense, Dang did not make out the required elements of the defense.”); Thom v. Ashcroft, 
369 F.3d 158, 165 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Rather than deciding the question, we, like the Supreme 
Court in Costello, find it more expedient to dispose of Petitioner’s claim on its specific 
merits.”); United States v. Koreh, 59 F.3d 431, 445 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Under the facts of this 
case, we need not resolve the question of the availability of a laches defense to a 
denaturalization action.  We agree with the district court that even if such a defense were 
available, Koreh has failed to establish the elements required to maintain the defense.”); 
United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1384 (7th Cir. 1986).  But see Savoury v. Attorney 
Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[A]fter years of failing to do so, the INS finally 
enforced the immigration laws against Savoury.  Laches cannot be asserted to prevent it 
from doing so.”); United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 964–65 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting 
the argument that laches can be raised as a defense in a denaturalization proceeding and also 
finding that, even if it were to consider the defense, it would not aid Mandycz). 
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in holding a hearing to rescind a noncitizen’s lawful permanent resident status.189  
In at least one case, however, the Third Circuit considered a laches defense 
brought by a company in an immigration case involving temporary work visas 
without questioning whether the defense could be made against the sovereign.190  
There, the court affirmed summary judgment against the company on the laches 
issue because it had failed to demonstrate prejudice.191 
The relevance of a laches defense to denaturalization and removal 
proceedings is becoming an increasingly important issue given recent 
government efforts to review old cases for fraud and misrepresentation.192  In 
2009, under President Obama, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
launched an initiative called “Operation Janus” to investigate cases of individuals 
who became U.S. citizens without disclosing old identities and deportation 
orders.193  That initiative identified 858 individuals whose paper fingerprint 
records had not yet been digitized when their citizenship applications were 
adjudicated, which means that it would have been easier for the government to 
miss fraud or misrepresentation in naturalization applications.194  In 2016, the 
DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reported that ICE had identified 
315,000 old fingerprint records for immigrants with final deportation orders or 
criminal records that were missing from the electronic database but still had not 
uploaded 148,000 of them.195  Since that OIG report’s publication, the 
government has dedicated more resources to uploading old fingerprint records 
dating back to the early 1990s.196   
Although the Supreme Court ruled in 2017 that citizenship could not be 
revoked based on falsehoods that did not influence the decision to grant 
 
189.  Onal, 18 I. & N. Dec. 147, 149–50 (B.I.A. 1981). 
190. Cyberworld Enter. Techs., Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 2010) (involving a 
nineteen-month delay by the Secretary of Labor in making a determination as to whether a 
temporary staffing company that placed H-1B employees with secondary employers had 
violated the INA by failing to inquire whether placements would displace U.S. workers). 
191. Id. 
192. Under the INA, a federal court may revoke citizenship through a civil or criminal 
proceeding if it was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation.  8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), (e) 
(2018); id. § 1425. 
193. U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Office of the Inspector Gen., Potentially Ineligible Individuals 




195. Id. at 2–3, 7. 
196. Amy Taxin, US Launched Bid to Find Citizenship Cheaters, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jun. 12, 
2018), https://apnews.com/1da389a535684a5f9d0da74081c242f3 [https://perma.cc/ 8ZEZ-
7JUW]. 
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citizenship,197 that has not deterred the Trump administration from aggressively 
pursuing denaturalization.  In 2018, President Trump created a denaturalization 
task force and launched “Operation Second Look,” which plans to review an 
estimated 700,000 immigration files.198  ICE requested $207.6 million in its fiscal 
year 2019 budget to hire 300 special agents and 212 support personnel to 
investigate more cases that potentially involve fraud or misrepresentation.199  In 
addition, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is opening a new 
office just to investigate potential denaturalization cases and plans to refer more 
cases for possible deportation.200  The new focus on reviewing immigration files 
dating back thirty years in order to revoke legal status suggests that a laches 
defense based on undue delay may become increasingly common in both 
denaturalization and removal proceedings.  
Not only naturalized citizens, but certain refugee populations are at risk.  
For example, USCIS has launched an investigation into potential identity fraud 
among Burmese refugees who were in Malaysia before being resettled in the 
United States, causing panic in that community.201  In February 2018, USCIS 
summoned over one thousand Burmese refugees for official interviews.202  While 
some of these refugees may have purchased other refugees’ identities or used fake 
names, others may simply have spelling errors or discrepancies in their 
identification documents due to “the scramble to register refugees who were 
fleeing persecution in Myanmar, then arrest in Malaysia,” where they were 
vulnerable to detention.203  Since most of these refugees were processed in 2009–
2010, their cases will likely be over a decade old by the time any actions are 
 
197. Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923 (holding that denaturalization under 18 
U.S.C. § 1425(a) based on a false statement to a government official requires the government 
to show that falsehood actually influenced the decision to grant citizenship). 
198. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Budget Overview, Fiscal 
Year 2019 Congressional Justification 21, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/publications/U.S.%20Immigration%20and%20Customs%20Enforcement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R5DY-EB2Y] [hereinafter ICE FY2019 Budget]; Masha Gessen, In 
America, Naturalized Citizens No Longer Have an Assumption of Permanence, New Yorker 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/in-america-
naturalized-citizens-no-longer-have-an-assumption-of-permanence [https://perma.cc/ 
76W7-WSHE]. 
199. ICE FY2019 BUDGET, supra note 198, at 20–21. 
200. See Patricia Mazzei, Congratulations, You Are Now a U.S. Citizen. Unless Someone Decides 
Later You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES, (July 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
07/23/us/denaturalize-citizen-immigration.html. 
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brought to revoke their status, suggesting that laches may be a relevant 
defense.204 
This Part has shown that courts recognize common law defenses in civil 
cases, and that they have even recognized common law defenses in some 
immigration cases arising under the INA.  The following Part explores the 
potential for common law defenses to play a much greater role in removal 
proceedings. 
III. INVOKING FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFENSES TO REMOVAL 
A noncitizen placed in removal proceedings is normally charged with one 
or more inadmissibility or deportability grounds under the INA.  These are civil, 
administrative charges that could lead to removal from the United States.  The 
Supreme Court has long recognized that deportation is a “penalty” of the most 
severe magnitude,205 and that it is “close to punishment for crime.”206  As Justice 
Field eloquently stated in 1893, “[I]f a banishment of this sort be not a 
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it would be difficult to 
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.”207  In 2010, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed in Padilla v. Kentucky that “deportation is a particularly severe 
‘penalty’” and stressed that removal proceedings are “intimately related to the 
criminal process.”208 
Scholars have examined removal proceedings’ quasicriminal nature and 
analyzed how the criminal and immigration systems are closely intertwined.209  
Yet neither scholars nor the judiciary have addressed the role of traditional 
 
204. See USCIS Conducting Re-Interviews of Certain Refugees, CATH. LEGAL IMMIGR. NETWORK, 
INC. (Mar. 13, 2018), https://cliniclegal.org/news/uscis-conducting-re-interviews-of-
certain-refugees [https://perma.cc/JC4X-MLS4] (“In 2014, USCIS learned that from 2009–
2010 there could be 1,700 Burmese refugees who either falsified personal information or 
whose personal information was used by someone else during refugee processing.”). 
205. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Fong How Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 
(1948) ; see also Lennon v. INS, 527 F.2d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 1975) (describing deportation as a 
penalty that “in [its] severity . . . surpasses all but the most Draconian criminal penalties”). 
206. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954). 
207. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 749 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
740 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home, 
and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant 
land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most severe and cruel.”). 
208. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (holding that it was ineffective assistance of 
counsel for a criminal defense attorney to fail to advise a client that a plea made him subject 
to deportation). 
209. See supra note 3; Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1919–20 (2000); 
Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011). 
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common law defenses in removal proceedings in a coherent or comprehensive 
manner.  Given the limited types of applications that can be filed in removal 
proceeding, the constraints on immigration judges’ authority to grant 
discretionary relief in individual cases, the gravity of what is at stake, and the lack 
of proportionality between the immigrant’s transgression in many cases and the 
consequence of deportation, all possible defenses must be explored.  While 
recognizing common law defenses in removal proceedings will not solve the 
inequities in the system or the well-documented problem of disproportionality,210 
these defenses can be a valuable tool to stop deportations in certain cases.  
Indeed, developing the law often involves taking unpopular legal theories and 
making them more popular.  
The idea that federal common law defenses exist in removal proceedings 
despite the complex legislative scheme crafted by Congress in the INA may seem 
improbable at first glance.  But Part I has shown that courts routinely apply many 
common law doctrines in interpreting the INA, and Part II has shown that courts 
not only recognize common law defenses in civil cases, but that they have already 
considered these defenses in some civil cases arising under the INA. 
Recognizing a role for common law defenses in removal proceedings does 
not mean that immigration judges would be required to readjudicate 
 
210. See, e.g., Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1671–79 
(2009) (arguing that certain deportation categories are punitive and subject to 
proportionality review under the Due Process Clause and proposing a rights-based form of 
statutory relief that would allow immigration judges to ensure proportionality); Angela M. 
Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62 EMORY L.J. 1243 
(2013) (making normative and historical arguments for noncitizens’ right to remain and 
arguing that deportation should only occur when it is a proportionate response to criminal 
activity); Jason Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in the 
Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029, 1041 (2017) (arguing that “concerns about 
disproportionate results have already motivated the Supreme court to make equity-driven 
adjustments to the removal system over the past fifteen years, in a break from long-standing 
policy of extreme deference to the political branches”); Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) 
Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring Proportionality, and Imagining Graduated 
Sanctions, 30 J.L. & POL. 465 (2015) (proposing a model for taking proportionality and 
affiliation rights seriously in a structural way) ; Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1683, 1738–40 (2009) (arguing that the concept of proportionality should be 
introduced into immigration law and that deportation’s costs would outweigh the benefits 
in situations involving “minor” violations, such as violating entry conditions); Maureen 
Sweeney & Hillary Scholten, Penalty and Proportionality in Deportation for Crimes, 31 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 11 (2011) (proposing a framework for understanding how Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence can support proportionality review in deportation cases);  
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and the Proportionality Requirement, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 415 (2012) (arguing that removal orders should be subject to constitutional 
proportionality review under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and Eighth 
Amendment and that, in certain cases, courts should find that deportation is so 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense as to be unconstitutional). 
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convictions for crimes.211  That clearly is not their role.212  However, many INA 
provisions do not require a criminal conviction to render someone removable 
from the United States, and it is those provisions that lend themselves most 
readily to common law defenses.  This Part shows that there is a small body of 
case law suggesting the viability of common law defenses in removal proceedings 
in at least some circumstances.  The discussion here focuses on three broad 
categories of cases under the INA in which the use of federal common law 
defenses seems particularly promising.  These categories are not mutually 
exclusive, nor are they an exhaustive list.  They simply provide a useful way to 
start thinking about the role that federal common law defenses can play in 
removal proceedings. 
The first category involves INA provisions that require an adjudicator to 
determine whether a noncitizen has violated a federal criminal law without 
requiring a conviction.  The second category involves INA provisions that bar 
asylum and a related form of relief called withholding of removal that are derived 
from international treaties and criminal culpability principles.  The third 
category involves INA provisions that have no explicit mens rea requirement 
and therefore no backdoor to introducing factors such as age, duress, or insanity, 
which can be captured with common law capacity defenses. 
A. INA Provisions Requiring a Determination of Whether Conduct Is 
Unlawful 
The most clear-cut situation in which common law defenses should be 
considered in removal proceedings involves INA provisions that require the 
immigration judge to determine whether an alien has engaged in unlawful 
conduct.  In Keathley v. Holder,213 the Seventh Circuit considered whether an 
entrapment by estoppel defense was applicable to a noncitizen who had been 
ordered removed for voting in a federal election.214  Keathley, a citizen of the 
Philippines, entered the United States with a fiancé visa and then married a U.S. 
 
211. For a discussion of how state courts have become “venues where the determinative decision 
for immigration purposes (the conviction) is negotiated even while the formal responsibility 
for implementing the consequences of those decisions (deportation) remains in removal 
proceedings,” see Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 553, 556 
(2013). 
212. See, e.g., Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 304 (B.I.A. 1996) (“[I]n ascertaining the effect 
of a criminal conviction, neither the Board nor the Immigration Judge may go beyond the 
judicial record to determine the guilt or innocence of an alien . . . .  He must be considered 
guilty of the crime.” (citations omitted)). 
213. 696 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2012). 
214. Id. 
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citizen.  An Illinois government official who knew that Keathley was not a citizen 
asked her if she would like to vote, and Keathley answered “yes.”  The state of 
Illinois subsequently sent her a voter registration card, further leading her to 
believe that voting would be lawful, and she voted in the November 2006 
election.  During her interview to adjust her status to legal permanent residence, 
immigration officials discovered that she had voted and denied her application. 
The federal government then placed Keathley in removal proceedings, and 
she made an entrapment by estoppel defense.  The immigration judge and BIA 
rejected the defense, finding that it was a criminal law doctrine with no relevance 
to immigration proceedings.215  The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed, holding 
that just because entrapment by estoppel is a defense in criminal proceedings, “it 
does not follow that the defense is irrelevant in civil proceedings.”216  The court 
explained that the INA provision under which Keathley was charged, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(10)(D)(i), declares that an alien who voted in violation of federal or 
state law is inadmissible, and the criminal law that makes it unlawful for an alien 
to vote is 18 U.S.C. § 611.217  Because “the only way to determine whether a 
person has violated a criminal statute is to examine both the elements of that law 
and all defenses properly raised,” the court reasoned that “[i]f Keathley has a 
good defense, she has not violated § 611 and remains eligible for adjustment of 
status,” the process of becoming a permanent resident.218  The court remanded 
the case for factual findings relevant to the entrapment by estoppel defense. 
Numerous other INA provisions likewise require courts to determine 
whether a criminal law has been violated, without requiring a conviction.  For 
example, Section 212(a)(3)(A)(i) renders as inadmissible any noncitizen who 
has “violat[ed] any law of the United States relating to espionage or sabotage 
or . . . any law prohibiting the export from the United States of goods, 
technology, or sensitive information.”219  Section 212(a)(3)(G) provides that 
“[a]ny alien who has engaged in the recruitment or use of child soldiers in 
violation of section 2442 of title 18, is inadmissible.”220  Section 212(a)(6)(E)(i) 
states that “[a]ny alien who at any time knowingly has encouraged, induced, 
assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the United 
 
215. Id. at 646. 
216. Id. 
217. There is an analogous deportability ground at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6)(A) (2018). 
218. Keathley, 696 F.3d at 646; cf. Kimani v. Holder, 695 F.3d 666, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that entrapment by estoppel was not available to the petitioner as a defense where he falsely 
represented himself to be a citizen on the form and presented no evidence that a government 
official told him to vote or assured him that voting was lawful). 
219. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(i) (2018). 
220. INA § 212(a)(3)(G), id. § 1182(a)(3)(G) (emphasis added). 
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States in violation of law is inadmissible.”221  Analogous deportability grounds 
similarly depend on violations of law, but do not require a conviction.222  In 
applying these provisions, an adjudicator must determine whether a noncitizen 
has violated a U.S. law, which, in turn, requires considering any common law 
defenses. 
This reasoning also applies to INA provisions that pertain to “unlawful” 
conduct such as “terrorist activity.”  The INA defines “terrorist activity” to 
include “any activity which is unlawful . . . which involves . . . [using an] 
explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere 
personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the 
safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.”223  
In McAllister v. Attorney General, the Third Circuit implied that common law 
defenses can be used to challenge a terrorist-activity allegation.  In this case, a 
noncitizen raised three examples that he argued would constitute terrorist 
activity under this sweeping definition: “an 8-year-old child who brings a 
baseball bat to school to protect himself from bullies; an individual 
institutionalized for a mental health disorder who attacks a doctor; [and] a 
woman who protects herself, in the course of a domestic violence attack, which 
standard kitchen cooking utensils.”224  The Third Circuit rejected all of these 
examples, explaining that none would constitute terrorist activity, because “both 
the little boy and the battered wife have acted in self-defense, which negates the 
‘unlawful’ element.”225  The court further noted that “t[h]e institutionalized 
individual in all likelihood does not have the capacity to satisfy the intent 
requirement under the common law.”226  Thus, federal common law defenses are 
relevant to challenge the applicability of INA provisions that require a 
determination of whether conduct is “unlawful.”  Yet it is all too common for 
immigration judges who are not used to considering common law defenses to 
skip this critical step. 
Some might argue that immigration judges are ill-equipped to consider 
common law defenses to determine whether a criminal law has been violated.  
 
221. INA § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), id. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (emphasis added). 
222. See INA § 237(a)(4)(F), id. § 1227(a)(4)(F) (“[a]ny alien who has engaged in the recruitment 
or use of child soldiers in violation of section 2442 of title 18, is deportable” (emphasis 
added)); INA § 237(a)(1)(E), id. § 1227(a)(1)(E) (“[a]ny alien who . . . knowingly has 
encouraged, induced, assisted, abetted, or aided any other alien to enter or to try to enter the 
United States in violation of law is deportable” (emphasis added)). 
223. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2018) (emphasis added). 
224. McAllister v. Attorney Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2006). 
225. Id. at 186–87. 
226. Id. at 187. 
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But immigration judges and the BIA routinely scrutinize criminal statutes and 
apply criminal law principles.  For example, in applying the categorical 
approach,227 immigration judges must determine whether a given criminal 
offense falls within the complicated “aggravated felony” or “crime involving 
moral turpitude” definition.228  As part of that analysis, immigration judges must 
also determine whether state criminal statutes are divisible into discrete 
offenses.229  In one case, for example, the BIA had to examine Puerto Rico’s 
aggravated-battery crime for the breadth of conduct that would support a 
criminal conviction in that jurisdiction.230  Given that immigration judges and 
the BIA are well-versed in making complex determinations that involve 
examining criminal statutes and the cases interpreting those statutes, they can 
also capably consider common law defenses to crimes. 
B. INA Provisions Barring Asylum and Withholding of Removal 
In 1980, Congress amended the INA to conform domestic laws to 
international standards in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of 
Refugees.231  Those amendments introduced the statutory provisions governing 
asylum, as well as a related form of relief called withholding of removal that 
codifies the international nonrefoulement obligation, the prohibition against 
returning an individual to a country in which there is a threat to her life or 
freedom.232  The INA includes several bars to both asylum and withholding of 
removal that are derived from the Refugee Convention.233  If these bars apply, 
noncitizens can be deported despite a serious risk of future persecution in their 
 
227. For a description of the categorical approach, see supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
228. See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical 
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673 (2011). 
229. See Chairez-Castrejon, 27 I. & N. Dec. 21, 23–24 (B.I.A. 2017). 
230. Guzman-Polanco, 26 I. & N. Dec. 713 (B.I.A. 2016). 
231. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the 
legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that 
one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance 
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . to which the 
United States acceded in 1968.”). 
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018) (defining a refugee); id. § 1158 (asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(A) 
(withholding of removal); see also 8 C.F.R. 1208.16 (2018) (withholding of removal). 
233. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2) (bars to asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (bars to withholding of 
removal), with Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1F, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].  See also Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, January 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol] (amending the Refugee 
Convention to include persons becoming refugees after January 1, 1951 and incorporating, 
inter alia, the Convention’s refugee definition and bars to refugee status). 
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countries of origin.  Whether a bar to persecution applies can therefore have life 
or death consequences. 
This Subpart addresses two of the bars to asylum and withholding of 
removal: the serious nonpolitical crime bar and the persecution of others bar.234  
This Subpart does not discuss the bar to asylum and withholding of removal 
based on providing “material support” to a terrorist organization,235 because the 
BIA has already held that there is no duress defense to that bar, which makes it a 
less compelling candidate for common law defenses.236 
There are several reasons why federal common law defenses are 
particularly relevant to interpreting the nonpolitical crime and persecutor bars.  
To begin with, these bars derive from principles of culpability under 
international criminal law, which incorporate common law defenses.  In 
addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
UN agency responsible for interpreting the Refugee Convention, has construed 
these bars in ways that incorporate several federal common law defenses 
discussed in Part II above.  Lastly, these bars bear on the nonrefoulement 
principle, which has become part of customary international law (CIL).237  As 
Louis Henkin has explained, since CIL derives from international-community 
practice, not U.S. policy codified in federal statutes, “when courts determine 
international law, they do not act as surrogates for the national legislature.”238  
For this reason, CIL is not an area in which federal common law should 
reflexively “bow to [federal] legislation.”239   
 
234. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018) (persecutor bar to asylum); id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) 
(serious nonpolitical crime bar to asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (persecutor bar to 
withholding of removal); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (serious nonpolitical crime bar to 
withholding of removal). 
235. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV) (2018). 
236. M-H-Z-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 757 (B.I.A. 2016). 
237. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Executive Comm. Conclusion No. 25 (XXXIII), ¶ (b) 
(Dec. 2009); see also Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the Int’l Prot.of 
Refugees in Central Am., Mex. & Pan, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, rev. 1, Section III(5) (Nov. 22, 1984), 
https://www.oas.org/dil/1984_cartagena_declaration_on_refugees.pdf; see generally Alice 
Farmer, Non-Refoulement and Jus Cogens: Limiting Anti-Terror Measures That Threaten 
Refugee Protection, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2008). 
238. Henkin, infra note 239, at 876. 
239. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese 
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 876 (1987) (arguing that customary 
international law (CIL) is not inferior to federal statutes because “the reasons that common 
law bows to [federal] legislation are inapplicable to international law”).  Other scholars have 
been much more skeptical about how “federal courts can apply a newly-developed norm of 
CIL as a matter of federal common law to invalidate a prior inconsistent federal statute.”  
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 843 (1997). 
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1. The Serious Nonpolitical Crime Bar 
A person is barred from asylum and withholding of removal if they have 
committed a “serious nonpolitical crime.”240  The fact that the word crime is used 
in this bar itself indicates that common law defenses should be considered based 
on the reasoning discussed in Subpart III.A: Just like inadmissibility and 
deportability grounds that require conduct to be “unlawful” or “in violation of 
law,” this bar requires a crime, and whether a crime has actually been committed 
requires considering relevant defenses.  Since the serious nonpolitical crime bar 
does not require a conviction, the determination of whether a crime has been 
committed does not involve reassessing culpability that a criminal court has 
already determined.241 
This approach is consistent with UNHCR’s interpretation of the exclusion 
clauses in Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, which uses language that is 
nearly identical to the serious nonpolitical crime bar in the INA.242  With respect 
to all exclusion clauses, UNHCR has emphasized individual responsibility, 
noting that “[i]n some cases, an individual may not have the mental capacity to 
be held responsible for a crime, for example, because of insanity, mental 
handicap, involuntary intoxication, or, in the case of children, immaturity.”243  
UNHCR has further stated that “[f]actors generally considered to constitute 
defences to criminal responsibility should be considered.”244  The duress defense, 
for example, “applies where the act in question results from the person 
concerned necessarily and reasonably avoiding a threat of imminent death, or of 
continuing or imminent serious bodily harm to him– or herself or another 
person, and the person does not intend to cause greater harm than the one 
sought to be avoided.”245  Similarly, “[a]ction in self-defence or in defence of 
others or of property must be reasonable and proportionate in relation to the 
 
240. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2018). 
241. By contrast, the particularly serious crime bar to asylum and withholding of removal 
specifically requires a conviction.  Id. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). 
242. Compare Id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (serious nonpolitical crime bar to asylum) and id. 
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (serious nonpolitical crime bar to withholding of removal), with 
Refugee Convention, supra note 233, art. 1F(b). 
243. U.N. Refugee Agency, Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 
Clauses: Article 1(F) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees ¶ 21, 
HCR/GIP/03/05 (Sept. 4, 2003), https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3f7d48514.pdf#zoom=95 
[https://perma.cc/ZR4R-AHB7]. 
244. Id. ¶ 22. 
245. Id. 
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threat.”246  These interpretations by UNHCR mirror the requirements of the 
common law defenses for duress and self-defense. 
With respect to the “serious nonpolitical crime” bar specifically, UNHCR 
has indicated that adjudicators should consider mitigating circumstances, such 
as “provocation and self-defense,” as well “minority of the offender.”247  UNHCR 
has further explained that in determining whether a crime is political, as opposed 
to nonpolitical, “[t]he political element of the offence should [] outweigh its 
common-law character,” which also suggests a role for common law defenses, 
because the term “common-law character” indicates a need to analyze whether 
the act would qualify as a crime under common law.248  The test the BIA adopted 
for determining whether an act constitutes a serious nonpolitical crime reflects 
important aspects of UNHCR’s definition.  The BIA’s test requires immigration 
judges to assess whether “the criminal nature” of the conduct “outweigh[s] its 
political nature.”249  As discussed in Subpart III. A above, assessing the “criminal 
nature” of an act requires considering common law defenses.  Furthermore, 
there are a handful of cases in which immigration judges, the BIA, and circuit 
courts have considered self-defense and duress in assessing an act’s “criminal 
nature” as part of this balancing test.  But adjudicators are not doing this 
routinely, explicitly, or in a manner that necessarily tracks the common law 
defenses’ elements. 
One of the few cases in which circuit courts have at least implicitly 
recognized the role of common law defenses to the serious nonpolitical crime 
bar is Efe v. Holder.250  There, the Fifth Circuit considered and rejected a 
petitioner’s argument that he did not commit a serious nonpolitical crime 
because his actions involved self-defense.  Significantly, the court did not refuse 
to consider self-defense in its analysis; it simply concluded that the petitioner had 
 
246. Id. 
247. GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (2007) 
(describing a 1980 proposal by UNHCR to the U.S. authorities suggesting that these 
mitigating circumstances tend to rebut the presumption of a serious crime). 
248. United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 152 (2d ed. 1992, reissued 2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3d58e13b4.pdf [https://perma.cc/WL66-FNGQ] [hereinafter 
UNHCR Handbook].  UNHCR has drawn heavily on the jurisprudence of common law 
countries in interpreting the Refugee Convention. 
249. INA v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 429–31 (1990) (finding the BIA’s interpretation that 
the criminal nature of the offense must outweigh its political character permissible and 
holding that “[t]he criminal element of an offense may outweigh its political aspect even if 
none of the acts are deemed atrocious”); see also McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97–98 (B.I.A. 
1984) (“In evaluating the political nature of a crime, we consider it important that the 
political aspect of the offense outweigh its common-law character.”). 
250. 293 F.3d 899, 906 (5th Cir. 2002). 
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not actually acted in self-defense.  The court found that the “more likely account 
of how the stabbing took place has [the petitioner] escaping the beating, entering 
a house, finding a knife, running back out into the demonstration, and killing the 
police officer.”251  Since the petitioner “was no longer under immediate threat of 
physical harm once he escaped into the house,” the court “rule[d] out his self-
defense claim.”252 
In at least two cases, the Sixth Circuit has also indicated a willingness to 
consider common law defenses in interpreting the serious nonpolitical crime 
bar.  Berhane v. Holder253 involved an Ethiopian asylum seeker who had thrown 
rocks at the police during antigovernment demonstrations in Ethiopia.254  While 
the court’s decision focused primarily on whether the noncitizen’s actions were 
political and whether they were serious, the court noted that “[n]either the Board 
nor the Immigration Judge . . . addressed one of Berhane’s principal arguments: 
that his rock throwing was an act of self defense [sic] and was never directed at 
civilians.”255  The court went on to explain that a self-defense theory “might 
diminish the criminal nature of the actions, which weighs in the balance.”256  
While this language recognizes self-defense as relevant to evaluating criminal 
culpability, it is still tentative, using the word “might.”  Furthermore, at no point 
does the Sixth Circuit refer to self-defense as an affirmative common law defense 
or mention its elements. 
In Urbina-Mejia v. Holder,257 decided that same year, the Sixth Circuit 
considered an argument resembling a common law duress defense.  The case 
involved a teenager from Honduras who had joined the 18th Street gang at age 
fourteen after “members of the gang informed him that he was to join their 
gang . . . and told him to go to the football field where they ‘persuaded’ him to 
join by continuously beating him for eighteen seconds.”258  The immigration 
judge and BIA determined that he committed a serious nonpolitical crime based 
on “his actions while a member of the gang, including hitting a man in the back 
with a baseball bat and extorting people for money on the street.”259  Although 
Urbina-Mejia argued that he had been coerced to commit these acts as a juvenile 




253.   606 F.3d 819 (6th Cir. 2010). 
254. Id. at 823.  
255. Id. at 825. 
256. Id. 
257.   597 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2010). 
258. Id. at 362. 
259. Id. at 369. 
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that Urbina-Mejia “possessed a ‘fair amount of autonomy’ in that he shared the 
proceeds of his crimes and carried a firearm.”260  The BIA and Sixth Circuit 
affirmed this finding without much analysis.  While Urbina-Mejia shows that the 
BIA and Sixth Circuit were willing to consider an argument resembling a 
common law duress defense, the decision makes no reference to the elements for 
establishing duress and never mentions the common law. 
Matter of E-A-,261 a subsequent BIA decision addressing the serious 
nonpolitical crime bar, discussed duress and self-defense.  The case involved an 
asylum seeker who had been employed as a driver for the Democratic Party of 
Cote d’Ivoire’s youth group from 1994 to 1999.262  On “five or six occasions in 
1994, the applicant participated as a member of this group while it burned 
passenger buses and cars, threw stones, pushed baskets of food off the heads of 
merchants as they walked on the streets, and threw merchandise off of 
merchants’ tables in the market.”263  No one was hurt during these incidents.264  
The applicant testified that he was coerced into committing these acts because 
party leaders were watching him, and he feared losing his job or being thrown 
into prison if he refused to participate.265 
In analyzing this case, the BIA rejected the coercion argument, reasoning 
that the applicant’s fear “was speculative and not based on any specific, credible 
threat or any evidence that such actions had been carried out on others similarly 
situated to him.”266  The BIA further found that “[t]he applicant’s generalized 
fear is not sufficient to show that he would have suffered any dire consequences, 
such as serious physical harm or economic persecution, if he had refused to 
participate in the group.”267  In a footnote, the BIA mentioned that its analysis of 
the criminal nature of the applicant’s conduct could be different if the facts 
indicated self-defense, but there was no such evidence here.268  Ultimately, the 
BIA concluded that the acts cumulatively triggered the serious nonpolitical 
crime bar.269 
While the BIA’s decision is promising insofar as it acknowledges that 
duress and self-defense are relevant to the serious nonpolitical crime analysis, it 
 
260. Id. at 363. 




265. Id. at 7. 
266. Id. at 7–8. 
267. Id. at 8. 
268. Id. at 7 n.6. 
269. Id. at 8–9. 
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also raises significant concerns.  To begin with, just like the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuit cases discussed above, the BIA’s decision does not explicitly describe 
duress or self-defense as affirmative common law defenses or explain their 
elements.  This makes it difficult for asylum applicants and attorneys to know 
what they need to prove to establish self-defense or duress in order to overcome 
the serious nonpolitical crime bar.  The BIA’s analysis suggests that the applicant 
failed to establish an impending threat of death or serious bodily injury and a 
well-grounded fear that those threats would be carried out, two of the elements 
that courts generally require for a duress defense.  The reference to economic 
persecution, however, breaks away from the traditional elements of the criminal 
duress defense and suggests a slightly different test.  As the Supreme Court has 
noted, there is no federal statute defining the duress defense’s elements, and the 
Court itself has repeatedly declined to define the elements.270  While the BIA 
recently defined the elements of duress for purposes of the persecutor bar, 
discussed further below,271 it may not necessarily define duress the same way 
with respect to the serious nonpolitical crime bar.   
Furthermore, the language the BIA uses suggests that it is not treating 
duress and self-defense as complete defenses, but as mitigating factors, which 
differs from the traditional understanding of an affirmative defense.  Under the 
BIA’s analysis, facts showing coercion and self-defense go to the weight given to 
criminal culpability in the balancing test for determining whether an act 
constitutes a serious nonpolitical crime, rather than to the conclusion that the act 
was not a crime at all.  Finally, the BIA’s finding that numerous acts, which 
occurred over several years, cumulatively rose to the level of a serious 
nonpolitical crime complicates any attempt to apply common law defenses in 
this context.  Would self-defense and duress need to be established for each act 
or for only some of the acts?  By assessing a series of acts in their totality, the BIA 
again departs from the traditional approach to criminal culpability, making it 
even more difficult to determine how to establish a defense. 
2. The Persecutor of Others Bar 
The persecutor bar to asylum and withholding of removal applies if an 
individual has persecuted other people on account of their race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.272  This 
 
270. Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 (2006). 
271. See Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347, 363 (B.I.A. 2018). 
272. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i) (2018) (persecutor bar to asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) 
(persecutor bar to withholding of removal). 
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bar is based on Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention, which applies to an 
individual who “has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make 
provision in respect of such crimes.”273  Although the persecutor bar’s language 
is different than that of Article 1F(a), the BIA has recognized that the persecutor 
bar should be construed consistently with Article 1F(a).274  In addition, UNHCR 
has interpreted “a crime against humanity” under Article 1F(a) to include 
“persecution, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any 
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds.”275 
The repeated use of the word “crime” in Article 1F(a) clearly roots the 
persecutor bar in criminal-culpability principles.276  Article 1F(a) also specifies 
that the crime should be interpreted as “defined in the international 
instruments.”277  The term “international instruments” refers to several 
documents that existed when the Refugee Convention was drafted, including the 
1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (also known as the 
Nuremberg Charter or London Charter), the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 
1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, and the 1950 
reports of the International Law Commission (ILC).278  Additionally, however, 
UNHCR has explained that Article 1F(a) allows for “a dynamic interpretation of 
the relevant crimes so as to take into account developments in international law,” 
 
273. Refugee Convention, supra note 233, art. 1F(a); see also JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE 
FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 524 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining that Article 1F excludes 
those who are undeserving of protection because they are “seeking to evade legitimate 
prosecution or punishment for serious domestic crimes, . . . have committed serious 
international crimes, . . . [or are] guilty of actions contrary to the principles and purposes of 
the UN”); James C. Hathaway, The Michigan Guidelines on the Exclusion of International 
Criminals, 35 MICH. J. INT’L L. 3, 7 (2013) (“The fundamental object and purpose of Article 
1(f)(a) is to exclude persons whose international criminal conduct means that their 
admission as a refugee threatens the integrity of the international refugee regime.”). 
274. See Alvarado, 27 I.& N.  27, 30 n.3 (B.I.A. 2017). 
275. U.N. Refugee Agency Standing Comm., Note on the Exclusion Clauses, (May 30 1997), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/excom/standcom/3ae68cf68/note-exclusion-clauses.html 
[https://perma.cc/AP5F-DB78]; see also U.N. Refugee Agency, Background Note on the 
Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees ¶ 34 (Sept. 4 2003), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5857d24.html 
[https://perma.cc/A7J2-GCE5] [hereinafter UNHCR Background Note] (including 
“persecution” among crimes against humanity); UNHCR Handbook, supra note 248, ¶ 149 
(explaining that Article 1F must be interpreted restrictively considering exclusion’s serious 
consequences). 
276. Refugee Convention, supra note 233, art. 1F(a). 
277. Id. 
278. UNHCR Background Note, supra note 275, ¶¶ 23–24. 
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thereby incorporating more recent instruments, such as the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court.279 
These instruments, and the war crimes prosecutions that followed World 
War II, recognize common law defenses.280  As Anthony D’Amato explained, 
“defenses available under the general principles of criminal law are of course 
available in war-crimes prosecutions, such as self-defense, being under 18 years 
old at the time of the commission of the crime, lacking criminal intent, or acting 
in self-defense.”281 
The commentaries to the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, which the ILC completed in 1951 at the UN General 
Assembly’s request, stresses the notion of “individual responsibility” and 
imposes two criteria in determining the defenses’ admissibility.282  First, defenses 
should be limited to those “that are well-established and widely recognized as 
admissible with respect to similarly serious crimes under national or 
international law.”283  Second, the court should consider the defense’s 
applicability in light of the character of the crime in a particular case.284 
The ILC’s commentaries recognize self-defense and duress as well-
established defenses, distinguishing duress from a defense of following superior 
orders.285  This is consistent with the conclusion reached by the UN War Crimes 
Commission’s Law Reports on Trials of War Criminals, published in 1949 based 
on a review of nearly 2000 decisions by military tribunals, as well as the various 
countries’ laws.286  The UN War Crimes Commission found that duress is a 
defense if the following three elements are satisfied: “(a) the act charged was done 
 
279. Id. ¶¶ 23–25.  The UNHCR also mentioned the statutes of the international criminal 
tribunals for the prosecution of serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  Id. 
280. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Obstacles to the Creation of a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 
18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 77, 93–94 (1994) (explaining that “[d]uress is traditionally a 
separate defense from superior orders”); Valerie Epps, The Soldier’s Obligation to Die When 
Ordered to Shoot Civilians or Face Death Himself, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 987, 990–91 (2003) 
(distinguishing duress from illegal superior orders). 
281. Anthony D’Amato, National Prosecution for International Crimes, in 3 INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 169, 295 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1987). 
282. Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind With Commentaries, 1996 
Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n 17, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.527, http://legal.un.org/ilc/ 
texts/instruments/english/commentaries/7_4_1996.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6SF-E9S3] 
[hereinafter Report of the ILC]; see also J. Spiropoulos (Special Rapporteur), Draft Code of 
Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, [1950]1 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm'n 725 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/25. 
283. Report of the ILC, supra note 282, at 39. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 40. 
286. 15 U.N. WAR CRIMES COMM’N, LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 174 (1949). 
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to avoid an immediate danger both serious and irreparable; (b) there was no 
adequate means of escape; (c) the remedy was not disproportionate to the 
evil.”287 
The ILC’s commentaries acknowledge that there is no minimum age for 
criminal responsibility under international law but advise that a competent 
court “may have to decide whether the youth of the accused at the time the 
alleged crime occurred should be considered to constitute a defence or 
extenuating circumstance in a particular case.”288  The commentaries also state 
that the UN War Crimes Commission “did not conduct an exhaustive analysis 
of the ages of the persons convicted . . . but noted that persons as young as fifteen 
years were of age were convicted and punished in some of these [war] trials.”289  
This implicitly suggests that it would be appropriate for a court to find that 
persons under age fifteen are not culpable, which is consistent with subsequent 
war-crime prosecution decisions.  For example, the prosecutor for the Special 
Court of Sierra Leone decided not to prosecute children under age fifteen.290 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted in 1998 
and entered into force in 2002, provides more recent guidance on defenses in this 
context.291  The defenses the Rome Statute recognized include a “mental disease 
or defect” that destroys the person’s capacity to appreciate the conduct’s 
unlawfulness or nature or the person’s ability to conform to the law’s 
requirements; involuntary intoxication; self-defense “in a manner 
proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other person or 
property protected”; and duress “resulting from a threat of imminent death or of 
continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another 
person,” as long as “the person acts necessarily and responsibly to avoid this 
threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the 
one sought to be avoided.”292  Although the Rome Statute does not mention age 
 
287. Id. at 174. 
288. Report of the ILC, supra note 282, at 41–42. 
289. Id. at 42. 
290. The founding prosecutor for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, David M. Crane, has argued 
that the Geneva Conventions’ special protections for children under fifteen during times of 
armed conflict, combined with the prohibition in the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
against the use of children in armed conflict, implies that “a child soldier recruited under 
duress cannot commit a war crime.”  David M. Crane, Prosecuting Children in Times of 
Conflict: The West African Experience, 15 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 11, 14 n.31 (2008) (explaining the 
decision not to prosecute children under fifteen as part of the war crimes trials in Sierra 
Leone). 
291. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 31, U.N. Doc. 32/A/CONF.183/9, 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998). 
292. Id. 
194 66 UCLA L. REV. 142 (2019) 
as a defense, it requires the crime’s material elements to be committed with 
“intent and knowledge” in order for an individual to be held responsible.293 
International law scholars have paid the most attention to the duress 
defense to the persecutor bar.  After carefully analyzing the origins of the 
exclusion clauses of the Refugee Convention, including the international 
instruments and military tribunal decisions discussed above, decisions by other 
state parties to the Refugee Convention, and the U.S. legislative history behind 
the persecutor bar, Kate Evans concluded that duress should be recognized as a 
defense to the persecutor bar.294  Other international law scholars have also 
supported this position in amici briefs.295   
In Hernandez v. Reno, the Eighth Circuit considered a case involving a 
Guatemalan man whom guerrillas had forcibly recruited and ordered to shoot at 
peasants.296  The court deemed it necessary to “engage in a particularized 
evaluation in order to determine whether an individual’s behavior was culpable 
to such a degree that he could be fairly deemed to have assisted or participated in 
persecution.”297  Although the word duress was not explicitly mentioned in the 
case, the court’s culpability analysis clearly contemplates this defense.  In 
vacating the BIA’s decision for not considering all of the relevant evidence, the 
court stressed that the BIA should have taken into account the petitioner’s 
“uncontroverted testimony that his involvement . . . was at all times involuntary 
and compelled by threats of death,” that he participated “in fear for his life,” and 
that “the commander stood behind him during the shooting and checked the 
magazine of his rifle afterwards.”298 
 
293. Id. art. 30.1.  The Rome Statute defines “intent” to mean that: “(a) In relation to conduct, 
that person means to engage in the conduct; (b) In relation to a consequence, that person 
means to cause that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of 
events.”  Id. art. 30.2.  “Knowledge” means “awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”  Id. art. 30.3. 
294. Kate Evans, Drawing Lines Among the Persecuted, 101 MINN. L. REV. 453, 538 (2016). 
295. See Brief for Scholars of International Refugee Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner 
at 28–31, Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499) (describing the connection 
between the international military tribunals and exclusions contained in the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol); Proposed Brief of Scholars of International Refugee Law as 
Amici Curia at 4–6, Amicus Invitation, No. 16-08-08 (B.I.A. 2016), 
https://www.uidaho.edu/~/media/UIdaho-Responsive/Files/law/academics/practical-
skills/clinics/BIA-Law-Scholars-Amicus-Brief-Persecutor-Bar.ashx [https://perma.cc/ 
H9YK-QVZE] (arguing that Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention “expressly 
incorporate[d] international criminal law principles of culpability including commonly 
applicable defenses to liability” and is “ultimately concerned with those culpable individuals 
who bear responsibility for persecuting others”). 
296. Hernandez v. Reno, 258 F.3d 806, 808–09 (8th Cir. 2001). 
297. Id. at 813. 
298. Id. at 814. 
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In 2018, the BIA finally recognized a narrow duress exception to the 
persecutor bar in Negusie, a case that the Supreme Court had remanded nine 
years earlier so that the BIA could address the issue in the first instance.299  The 
BIA adopted a five-part test for duress, stating:  
While we need not define the precise boundaries of a duress standard 
in the context of this case, at a minimum, the applicant must establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he (1) acted under an 
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to himself or others; 
(2) reasonably believed that the threatened harm would be carried out 
unless he acted or refrained from acting; (3) had no reasonable 
opportunity to escape or otherwise frustrate the threat; (4) did not 
place himself in a situation in which he knew or reasonably should 
have known that he would likely be forced to act or refrain from acting; 
and (5) knew or reasonably should have known that the harm he 
inflicted was not greater than the threatened harm to himself or 
others.300 
The BIA explained that last element of proportionality “derives from 
international law” and “narrows the scope of the duress defense,” requiring the 
harm threatened against the applicant to rise to the level of persecution.301  
However, the only legal authorities that the BIA cited for incorporating the 
proportionality element were Canadian cases.302  The BIA found that Negusie, 
who had been forcibly conscripted into the Eritrean army, failed to satisfy the 
elements of duress, reasoning that “the threats of death he received, should he 
disobey orders . . . did not constitute the imminent threat of death or serious 
bodily injury required to meet the standard of duress.”303  The BIA further found 
that he had a reasonable opportunity to escape, because “he eventually escaped 
through a ‘weak spot’ and walked through the jungle to his friend’s home.”304  
Although the BIA’s decision in Negusie set a high bar for a duress defense, now-
former Attorney General Sessions issued an automatic stay of the decision and 
certified it to himself for reconsideration.305  At the time of this writing, the 
Attorney General had not yet issued his decision, but his decision to reconsider 
the relevance of a duress defense suggests that he may well overrule the BIA’s 
decision. 
 
299. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009). 
300. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 363. 
301. Id. at 364–65. 
302. Id. at 364. 
303. Id. at 368. 
304. Id. 
305. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 481 (B.I.A. 2018). 
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At least one court has also recognized self-defense to as a defense to the 
persecutor bar.  In Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit held that acts of self-
defense do not count as persecution of others.306  There, the petitioner was a 
Bosnian Serb who admitted that he had beaten Croats who attacked his town in 
1990 with sticks.307  The immigration judge deemed him ineligible for asylum 
based on the persecutor bar, finding no exception for acts of self-defense.308  In 
rejecting that reasoning, the Ninth Circuit explained that for the bar to apply, 
persecution must be on account of certain grounds, and acts of self-defense are 
not on account of any of those grounds.309  The court further reasoned that it 
would be contrary to the INA’s purpose to deny asylum to victims of oppression 
who “had the temerity to resist persecution by fighting back.”310  Finally, the 
court described self-defense as “nature’s eldest law” and one “of the most 
elemental characteristics of the human species.”311  A 2005 opinion by the 
Attorney General cites Hernandez with approval for the proposition that “[i]t is 
appropriate to look at the totality of the relevant conduct in determining whether 
the [persecutor] bar to eligibility applies.”312 
In addition to duress and self-defense, infancy has been raised as a defense 
to the persecutor bar.  There is no clear guidance under international criminal 
law regarding age as a defense, but decisions by prior war-crime tribunals 
generally have not prosecuted children under age fifteen.313  In the United States, 
there are currently no published decisions on point, but in at least one 
unpublished decision, the BIA upheld an immigration judge’s decision finding 
that a child soldier was not barred from asylum based on persecution of others, 
reasoning that because he “was a boy between the ages of 11 and 13 during the 
relevant period, we are not persuaded that he had the requisite personal 
culpability for ordering, inciting, assisting or otherwise participating in the 
persecution of others.”314 
 
306. Vukmirovic v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 1247, 1252–53 (9th Cir. 2004). 
307. Id. at 1249. 
308. Id. at 1250, 1253. 
309. Id. at 1251–52. 
310. Id. at 1252. 
311. Id. 
312. A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 785 (B.I.A. 2005); see also Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzalez, 449 F.3d 
915, 927 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that determining whether a petitioner “assisted in 
persecution” requires a particularized evaluation of both personal involvement and 
purposeful assistance in order to ascertain culpability). 
313. See supra notes 288– 290, 293, and accompanying text. 
314. Brief for Human Rights First et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, at *25, Negusie v. 
Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (No. 07-499), 2008 WL 2597010 (quoting BIA’s decision in E-
O-). 
Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases 197 
The cases discussed in this Subpart show that common law defenses have 
already played a role in interpreting the persecutor bar, but they have generally 
done so in an ad hoc manner without clear guidance from the BIA or Supreme 
Court, resulting in inconsistencies across cases.  Furthermore, besides the BIA’s 
recent decision in Negusie addressing a duress exception to the persecutor bar, 
which may soon be overruled by the Attorney General, the BIA has not clearly 
defined the elements of common law defenses in the deportation context.  Nor 
have federal appellate courts done so.  The BIA’s addition of proportionality as 
an element to the defense duress, which departs from the standard elements of 
duress in U.S. law, indicates that the elements may be modified in immigration 
cases.  It also remains unclear whether common law defenses are mitigating 
factors or complete defenses to deportation.  The description of these defenses as 
exceptions in the case law, rather than as affirmative defenses, also obscures the 
larger question about how the common law interacts with the INA. 
C. INA Provisions With No Explicit Mens Rea Requirement 
The third category of cases in which common law defenses may be especially 
relevant involves INA provisions with no explicit mens rea requirement.  If an 
inadmissibility or deportability ground has a mens rea requirement, an individual 
who committed an offense because of duress, self-defense, infancy, or insanity 
may lack the necessary mental state.  For example, in McAllister v. Attorney 
General, the court noted that an eight-year-old child or a mentally ill 
institutionalized individual would likely not satisfy the intent element for 
terrorist activity under the INA.315  When dealing with INA provisions that have 
no mens rea requirement, on the other hand, there is no backdoor for 
introducing such facts.  The ability to raise common law defenses therefore 
becomes more important. 
Take, for example, the INA provisions that render a noncitizen 
inadmissible and deportable for making a false claim to citizenship.316  This 
charge is often brought against individuals who use a fake U.S. passport or birth 
certificate to enter the country.  If an immigration or border patrol officer finds 
an individual has made a false claim to citizenship, there is no waiver available, 
and that person will be permanently barred from the United States.  Imagine a 
child whose parent gave her a fake U.S. passport or birth certificate and told her 
to show it to the officer at the port of entry.  The child may be too young to 
 
315. McAllister v. Attorney Gen., 444 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2006). 
316. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (2018) (inadmissibility ground); id. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i) 
(deportability ground). 
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understand what the document is or what it means to show it to the officer.  
Should this child be permanently barred from the country if the border patrol 
officer discovers the document is fake?  Could a common law infancy defense be 
raised in this situation? 
Unlike federal statutes such as the Higher Education Act, the INA does not 
expressly prohibit an infancy defense.317  However, since many INA provisions 
make explicit exceptions for children,318 and the false claim to citizenship 
provision does not, one could argue that Congress did not intend to carve any 
exceptions for children when it comes to making a false claim to citizenship.  On 
the other hand, one could invoke the same child-specific INA provisions to make 
the opposite argument—the INA’s distinction between children and adults 
reflects Congress’s recognition that children should be treated more leniently. 
Unfortunately, there is a dearth of precedent by the BIA and federal courts 
addressing whether an infancy defense can be made to various inadmissibility 
and deportability grounds, including the false claim to citizenship ground.  In an 
Eighth Circuit case, Sandoval v. Holder, the petitioner argued that the false claim 
to citizenship inadmissibility ground excluded unaccompanied minors.  The 
court observed: 
At oral argument, in contrast to the brief, the government conceded 
the statute would not apply to an eight-year-old child whose parents 
armed her with a fraudulent birth certificate and instructed her to say 
she was a United States citizen if asked by the officer.  Having thereby 
departed from the black-and-white construction of the statute in favor 
of the case-by-case approach, the government nevertheless struggled 
to articulate why Sandoval fell on the wrong side of the divide.319 
 
317. The Higher Education Act explicitly preempts an infancy defense based on state law.  See 20 
U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(2) (2018) (“[I]n collecting any obligation arising from a loan made under 
part B of this subchapter, a guaranty agency or the Secretary shall not be subject to a defense 
raised by any borrower based on a claim of infancy.”). 
318. For example, children under eighteen do not accrue unlawful presence in the United States.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(iii)(I) (2018).  Children under eighteen are not subject to the 
one-year deadline for applying for asylum.  See id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).  There is an 
exception to the inadmissibility ground for crimes involving moral turpitude if the crime 
was committed when the individual was less than eighteen years old and more than five 
years have passed since she committed the crime.  See id.  Unaccompanied minors at ports 
of entry are permitted to withdraw their applications for admission and avoid removal 
proceedings.  See id. § 1232(2)(B)(i).  Unaccompanied minors in removal proceedings are 
allowed to submit an affirmative asylum application to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) instead of filing it with the immigration court, giving them the special 
benefit of having “two bites at the apple.”  See id. § 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5)(ii) 
(2018).  There are special requirements for serving children under fourteen.  See id. 
§ 1240.10(c).  The government only fingerprints children over fourteen.  See id. § 1240.38. 
319. Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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Here, recognizing a common law infancy defense could have helped both 
parties articulate a rule to justify the divide.  Frustrated by the BIA’s repeated 
failure to issue a precedent decision on point, the court suggested at least three 
options for the BIA to consider: “(a) that the statute applies indiscriminately to 
any alien, no matter what the age; (b) that the statute has to be interpreted on a 
case-to-case basis with an eye toward certain factors; or (c) that the statute 
applies, perhaps presumptively, to all individuals above a certain age designated 
by the agency, but that age happens to be lower than eighteen.”320  In suggesting 
these options, however, even the court did not mention the common law infancy 
defense. 
Although the BIA still has not addressed this issue, the State Department 
and DHS have.  In March 2016, the State Department issued guidance on false 
claims to citizenship that has been incorporated into the Foreign Affairs Manual 
(FAM).321  The FAM now provides two affirmative defenses to the false claim 
ground.  One defense is that the false claim was not made knowingly, although 
the INA does not specify a mens rea.322  A separate affirmative defense is that the 
noncitizen was “(a) under the age of 18 at the time of the false citizenship claim; 
and (b) at that time lacked the capacity (i.e., the maturity and the judgment) to 
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of a false claim to 
citizenship.”323  The noncitizen bears the burden of establishing these affirmative 
defenses. 
This State Department guidance is consistent with USCIS’s most recent 
policy manual, which adopts the same rule as the FAM and further explains that 
in determining whether the noncitizen lacked capacity, officers should consider 
all relevant factors, including age, education level education, background, 
mental capacity, level of understanding, and ability to appreciate the difference 
between true and false.324  The policy manual stresses that although lack of 
capacity may arise most often in cases in which the noncitizen was under 
eighteen at the time of the false claim, age alone is insufficient to show lack of 
 
320. Id. 
321. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 302.9-5(B)(1) (2018).  The Foreign Affairs 
Manual provides guidance to State Department employees, but is not binding on DHS 
employees, which includes USCIS.  See Avena v. INS, 989 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997); Bosuego, 
17 I. & N. Dec. 125 (B.I.A. 1979). 
322. 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 302.9-5(B)(1)(a)(1) (2018). 
323. Id. 
324. U.S. DEPT’ OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.  SERVS., 8 U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERV. POLICY MANUAL, pt. K, ch. 2, D(4) (2018), 
https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume8-PartK-Chapter2.html#S-A 
[https://perma.cc/N8VF-EVP3]. 
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capacity.325  The officer must also determine whether the person who made the 
false claim “had the maturity and the judgment to understand and appreciate the 
nature and consequences of his or her actions at the time the false claim was 
made.”326 
Establishing lack of capacity is not an easy feat.  In a nonprecedential 
decision, the USCIS Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) addressed an 
applicant’s argument that he “lacked the capacity to understand and appreciate 
the nature and consequences of a false claim to U.S. citizenship, because he was 
a minor at the time.”327  The applicant in that case was a minor whose mother had 
told him to use his cousin’s U.S. birth certificate to enter the United States.  The 
AAO rejected this argument on its merits, reasoning that the applicant was 
aware that he was not a U.S. citizen at the time of the false claim and had stated 
that he believed using his cousin’s birth certificate “was not a good idea, 
demonstrating knowledge of falsity.”328  The AAO also used his initial resistance 
to the plan proposed by his family members as evidence that “he was old enough 
at the time of the misrepresentation to be held accountable for his actions.”329 
In concluding that the minor had made a false claim to U.S. citizenship, the 
AAO examined cases by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits addressing whether 
fraud by a parent could be imputed to a child.  The Sixth Circuit had found that 
immigration fraud committed by a five-year-old child’s parents could not be 
imputed to the child, as fraudulent conduct requires “both knowledge of falsity 
and an intent to deceive.”330  However, in another case involving two seventeen-
year-old brothers whose father had misrepresented their identities, nationality, 
and religious affiliation when he listed them as derivatives on his asylum 
application, the Seventh Circuit found that the brothers could be held 
accountable for that fraud.  The court reasoned that “given their ages at the time,” 
they were accountable for the misrepresentations, as “they were old enough to 
know better and to be held accountable for their actions.”331  The court noted that 
young is a “relative term” and that “[b]eing over 16—and eligible for a driver’s 
license—is quite different than being 10.”332 
This characterization of capacity is generally consistent with the way that 




327. Applicant, 2015 WL 4607762, at *1 (Dep’t of Homeland Sec., AAO July 6, 2015). 
328. Id. at *3. 
329. Id. 
330. Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400, 407 (6th Cir. 2006). 
331. Malik v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 890, 892–93 (7th Cir. 2008). 
332. Id. at 892. 
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individuals under eighteen into four categories and assigned them legal 
accountability accordingly.333  Lack of capacity was assumed for children under 
seven, and they could not be prosecuted.  A child between the ages of seven and 
eleven received a rebuttable presumption of incapacity.  Children ages twelve to 
fourteen also enjoyed a presumption, but a weaker one, as they were attributed 
greater physical and emotional maturity.  Between ages fourteen and eighteen, a 
child was presumed sufficiently mature to have capacity.  The AAO’s finding 
above that a sixteen-year-old is different than a ten-year-old is generally 
consistent with this common law scheme which recognizes changes in capacity 
as a child matures. 
While the false claim to citizenship ground has generated the most debate 
in terms of its application to children, other inadmissibility and deportability 
grounds that lack a mens rea requirement also raise similar questions.  Long 
before the false claim provision even existed in the INA, for example, 
prostitution was an inadmissibility ground without any exceptions based on 
infancy or duress.  Yet, in a 1956 case involving a minor who had been coerced 
into prostitution after being promised a different type of job in the United States, 
the BIA found that the prostitution ground did not apply.  The BIA explained 
that “those to whom respondent was indebted reduced her to such a state of 
mind that she was actually prevented from exercising her free will through the 
use of wrongful, oppressive threats or unlawful means.”334  This decision suggests 
that the BIA was considering, without explicitly naming, common law defenses 
of infancy and duress. 
The inadmissibility ground for alien smuggling also does not specify a 
mens rea and invites potential defenses of infancy and duress.335  Organizations 
have documented that gangs use children to smuggle people into the United 
States.336  Similarly, the inadmissibility ground pertaining to child-soldier 
recruitment makes no exception for situations in which the recruiter is a child.337  
Owing to the lack of precedents on these points, adjudicators who are faced with 
these situations currently have to make their own decisions regarding whether 
to take a child’s age, mental capacity, and other circumstances into consideration 
in deciding whether the inadmissibility ground applies. 
 
333. Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy is the Preadolescent’s 
Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 168 (2000). 
334. M-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 251, 252 (B.I.A. 1956). 
335. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E) (2018). 
336. See Lucina Melesio & John Holman, Mexico Cartels Recruit Children to Smuggle People to 
US, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/mexico-cartels-
recruit-children-smuggle-people-171030103553245.html [https://perma.cc/ 3QGV-TJ3P]. 
337. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(G) (2018). 
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This ad hoc, arbitrary approach to common law defenses in cases involving 
the draconian consequence of removal from the United States defies notions of 
fundamental fairness.  Unless adjudicative bodies adopt a more thoughtful and 
structured approach, there will be no uniform way of handling these defenses, 
resulting in unpredictable approaches and inconsistent decisions. 
IV. CHALLENGES IN INVOKING FEDERAL COMMON LAW DEFENSES 
Even if courts agree that noncitizens should be allowed to raise common 
law defenses in removal proceedings, noncitizens will not necessarily prevail 
more often.  In assessing whether these defenses are likely to succeed, it is helpful 
to examine immigration-related criminal prosecutions.338  Prosecutions for 
immigration violations currently comprise 52 percent of all federal criminal 
prosecutions.339  Courts have considered necessity, duress, and insanity defenses 
in cases involving federal prosecutions for illegal entry,340 illegal reentry,341 alien 
smuggling,342 document misuse,343 and resisting departure under a deportation 
 
338. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 568 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing the 
insanity defense in a former boxer’s prosecution for illegal reentry in which the defendant 
argued that he suffered from brain damage that prevented him from understanding the 
nature of his presence in the United States); United States v. Portillo-Vega, 478 F.3d 1194 
(10th Cir. 2007) (recognizing duress defense in a prosecution for illegal reentry after 
deportation); United States v. Solorzano-Rivera, 368 F.3d 1073 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that duress did not negate the voluntariness of illegal reentry into the United States 
where the defendant had jumped the fence to escape harm by the Mexican police). 
339. Immigration Now 52 Percent of All Federal Prosecutions, TRAC (Nov. 28, 2016), 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446 [https://perma.cc/KJ56-NYLQ]; see also Jennifer 
M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009) 
(explaining how federal officials are using the criminal prosecution of migration-related 
offenses to regulate the migration flow); Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 YALE L.J. 
2282, 2287 (2013) (explaining that “immigration crime is the largest single category of crime 
prosecuted by the federal government”); Daniel I. Morales, Crimes of Migration, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2014) (noting the upward trajectory of “crimes of migration” 
prosecutions over the past decade). 
340. See, e.g., United States v. Grainger, 239 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[C]ommon law 
justification defenses like necessity and duress may be employed as a defense to a statutory 
crime such as illegal reentry into the United States.”). 
341. See supra note 338. 
342. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) 
(finding that defendants criminally charged with bringing and harboring Central 
Americans into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 failed to make a threshold 
showing for the necessity defense because they failed to establish that there were no other 
legal alternatives). 
343. United States v. Odeh, 815 F.3d 968 (6th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that the defendant’s 
diminished mental capacity may have affected how she answered questions on the 
naturalization application). 
Invoking Federal Common Law Defenses in Immigration Cases 203 
order.344  The legal hurdle defendants face in these types of cases is not whether 
courts have the authority to consider common law defenses, which is taken for 
granted in the criminal context, but whether the defense meets the threshold 
requirements to present to a jury.345   
In cases involving illegal entry, for instance, judges have found that 
defendants failed to show imminent harm where threats to their life were 
deemed too vague, past beatings did not objectively establish a “present, 
imminent, and impending” threat of death or serious bodily injury, or a 
medical condition was not “dire.”346  Judges have found that defendants failed 
to satisfy the direct causal relationship prong if they had already escaped a 
 
344. United States v. Kpomassie, 323 F. Supp. 2d 894 (W.D. Tenn. 2004) (holding that a 
defendant charged with preventing and hampering his departure pursuant to a deportation 
order made a prima facie showing of a necessity defense based on his fear of persecution in 
Togo). 
345. Defendants face challenges satisfying the threshold requirements in other situations as well, 
such as in civil disobedience cases.  James L. Cavallaro, Jr., The Demise of the Political 
Necessity Defense: Indirect Civil Disobedience and United States v. Schoon, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
351 (1993) (explaining that the last two prongs of the four-prong test for necessity present 
the biggest challenge and often prevent a jury from hearing the defense in federal civil 
disobedience cases, but defendants often win in state court using the necessity defense). 
346. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 803 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that 
a defendant charged with illegal reentry failed to demonstrate duress because he failed to 
show imminent threat of serious bodily harm based on vague threats against him and his 
family); United States v. Flores-Vasquez, 279 F. App’x 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that a 
duress defense was not warranted for defendant’s illegal reentry because an “objective view 
of the evidence” did not establish that he was under a “present, imminent, impending” 
threat of death or serious bodily injury when he illegally reentered the United States in 
January 2007, despite his claim that he was fleeing for his life from a gang in Honduras that 
had murdered his business partner in 2004, severely beaten him, and continued to threaten 
him); United States v. Xian Long Yao, 302 F. App’x 586, 587–88 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the defendant, who reentered Guam illegally, failed to show that he faced imminent harm in 
Saipan based on his fear of persecution by the Chinese government and failed to 
demonstrate that there were no lawful alternatives); United States v. Perdomo-Espana, 522 
F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the defendant failed to demonstrate the imminent 
harm required to present a necessity defense based on his medical condition of diabetes 
because his medical doctor concluded that his blood sugar levels were high but not dire 
when he was treated in the emergency room after crossing the border); United States v. 
Garcia, 182 F. App’x 731 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant could not make a duress 
defense because he did not face an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury from 
a Guatemalan vigilante squad when he entered the United States six weeks after his attack in 
Guatemala and had escaped the harm he faced in Guatemala when he fled to Mexico); 
United States v. Brizuela, No. B-13-CR-476-1, 2014 WL 2257405 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2014) 
(finding no imminent harm to support a duress defense where the 18th Street gang 
threatened the defendant two weeks before he came to the United States and tried to make 
him smuggle drugs across the border and also finding that the defendant failed to show that 
reasonable alternatives were not available because the defendant never tried to relocate 
within El Salvador or the two countries through which he traveled before reaching the 
United States). 
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dangerous situation or settled in a safe country before entering the United 
States.347  Furthermore, judges have found that defendants failed to 
demonstrate the absence of legal alternatives to illegal reentry, reasoning, for 
example, that they could have applied for asylum, gone to another country, 
relocated within their own country, applied for special permission to reenter 
the United States, gone to a legal entry point, or sought assistance from the 
police in their own country.348  These decisions suggest that necessity is an 
exceedingly tough defense to establish. 
It is particularly difficult to prevail with a common law defense in a case 
involving illegal entry or reentry, which courts consider a continuing 
offense.349  This means a defendant must show that the requirements for the 
defense existed throughout the entire period of the defendant’s time in the 
United States.  This reasoning would also likely apply in removal cases where 
the person is charged simply for being present in the United States without 
legal status.  Therefore, as a strategic matter, these cases are likely poor 
 
347. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez-Chavez, 596 F. App’x 290 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that a 
defendant charged with illegal reentry who had been kidnapped and badly beaten by 
smugglers in Mexico after hiring them to take him to the United States could not present 
duress evidence to the jury, because he had (1) already escaped his captors when he illegally 
entered the United States, (2) negligently placed himself in a dangerous situation by hiring 
a smugger, and (3) had other alternatives, like going to the police or to a legal entry point, 
once he escaped his captors); United States v. Grainger, 239 F. App’x 188 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the defendant failed to satisfy the threshold requirements for a necessity 
defense because, inter alia, he did not establish a direct causal relationship between his illegal 
reentry into the United States and the avoidance of imminent harm as he was already safely 
living in Canada when he illegally reentered the United States and took no steps to 
“discontinue his illegal conduct” during the two years he lived illegally in the United States). 
348. See, e.g., United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding the 
defendant was not entitled to the necessity defense to illegal reentry charges, despite alleged 
persecution in his home country, because he could not show that he had attempted to apply 
for political asylum and had not attempted to go to another country); Brizuela, 2014 WL 
2257405 (finding that the defendant failed to show reasonable alternatives were not available 
because he never tried to relocate within El Salvador or the two countries through which he 
traveled before entering the United States); United States v. Crown, No. 99 CR. 1044(AGS), 
2000 WL 709003 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2000) (holding that a defendant who was HIV positive 
and illegally reentered the United States after deportation to Belize did not satisfy the 
threshold requirements for a necessity defense because he could have applied for permission 
to reenter). 
349. See United States v. Jimenez, 605 F.3d 415, 422 (6th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds 
by Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011); United States v. Portillo-Vega, 478 F.3d 1194, 
1198–99 (10th Cir. 2007) (reasoning that to be entitled to a jury instruction about a duress 
defense, a defendant charged with illegal reentry under 18 U.S.C. § 1326(a) needed to show 
not only that he reasonably feared death or serious bodily injury when he reentered, but also 
throughout the duration of his illegal stay); United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 
598 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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candidates for raising common law defenses.350  It may be counterintuitive that 
a “pure” immigration violation, like being in the country without permission, 
would not have a defense, while violations more intertwined with a criminal 
offense would, since deportation seems a more disproportionate response to a 
pure immigration violation than a criminal offense.351  But recognizing 
common law defenses to unlawful presence in the United States would also 
come closest to rendering Congress’s legislative scheme ineffective by allowing 
the exceptions to swallow the rules and would therefore be especially 
vulnerable to attack under City of Milwaukee and other cases discussed in Part 
I above.  The three categories discussed in Part III above, on the other hand, 
provide much better starting points for introducing common law defenses, 
because they are narrow enough that they do not render Congress’s legislative 
scheme ineffective.  Making strategic decisions about when to raise common 
law defenses and which defenses are most likely to succeed will be important 
in laying the groundwork for bringing these defenses in immigration court. 
In addition to the legal hurdles imposed by the exacting elements of 
certain common law defenses, there are also significant factual hurdles.  
Gathering and presenting facts tend to be difficult for noncitizens in removal 
proceedings due a combination of factors including high detention rates, low 
representation rates, language and cultural barriers, and geographical and 
financial obstacles involved in obtaining witnesses and evidence often located 
in another country.352  While there is no magic fix to these problems, access to 
representation certainly helps and needs to be part of any broader strategy to 
address the asymmetry of power and availability of remedies in immigration 
court. 
 
350. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2018) (inadmissibility ground for aliens present without 
admission or parole). 
351. See Stumpf, supra note 210 (arguing that the concept of proportionality should be 
introduced into immigration law and that deportation’s costs would outweigh the benefits 
in situations involving minor violations, such as violating entry conditions); Amanda Frost, 
Cooperative Enforcement in Immigration Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2017) (proposing that 
immigration officials could adopt a cooperative-enforcement approach, whereby they 
would assist unauthorized immigrants who are low priorities for removal to legalize their 
status).  Under the REAL ID Act, an applicant must provide corroborating evidence to the 
immigration court unless the applicant “cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”  REAL ID 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-113 § 101(a)(3), 119 Stat. 231, 303 (2005); 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2018).  Failure to provide corroborating evidence to support a defense 
could therefore easily defeat it. 
352. As Judge Berzon on the Ninth Circuit has noted, factfinding generally “serves as a one-way 
ratchet that always favors the government.”  United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 
F.3d 915, 962 n.18 (9th Cir. 2011) (Berzon, J., concurring), abrogated by Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
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Beyond these legal and factual challenges, some might argue that pushing 
for the explicit recognition of common law defenses in removal proceedings 
could actually backfire and end up hurting noncitizens instead of helping 
them.  As discussed above, the BIA and circuit courts have not yet articulated 
the elements of duress, self-defense, and other defenses in the removal context.  
These defenses’ conception therefore remains somewhat vague and malleable 
which could cut in a noncitizen’s favor.  Explicitly adopting common law 
defenses could well lead to stricter evaluations of the elements required to 
establish a defense, such as the five-element standard for duress in Negusie, 
potentially resulting in the removal of some individuals who may have 
prevailed under the current, inchoate standards.353 
One way to address this concern, and perhaps also to mitigate the legal 
and factual challenges discussed above, is to propose modified standards for 
establishing common law defenses in removal proceedings.  Variations already 
exist among states and circuit courts regarding the exact elements of these 
defenses, and two Supreme Court justices have expressly invited the BIA to 
establish the elements of duress, indicating that there is room to formulate a 
definition specific to removal proceedings.354  There is precedent for such a 
move, as other administrative agencies have adopted their own standards for 
defenses such as duress.355  The BIA should seize this opportunity and 
formulate a modified version of common law defenses that take into 
consideration the unique aspects of removal proceedings including the 
asymmetries built into the system.  Indeed, one of the advantages of common 
law doctrines is that they allow for greater innovation and self-correction than 
 
353. Negusie, 27 I. & N. Dec. 347 (B.I.A. 2018). 
354. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 537–38 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“I would leave for the Attorney General—and, through his own 
delegation, the BIA—the question how the voluntariness standard should be applied.  The 
agency would retain the ability, for instance, to define duress and coercion; to determine 
whether or not a balancing test should be employed; and, of course, to decide whether any 
individual asylum-seeker’s acts were covered by the persecutor bar.”). 
355. Johnson v. Dep’t of Transp., FAA, 735 F.2d 510, 515 (Fed. Cir. 1984).  In this case involving 
a decision to remove a federal employee from his position for participation in the 
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization’s strike of 1981, the Merits Systems 
Protection Board (Board) rejected as “the appropriate standard for establishing a defense of 
coercion or duress, either the standard in criminal cases (threat of imminent death or 
personal bodily injury that the actor could not avoid) or that in civil cases generally (threats 
of most kinds of injury to persons or property).”  Instead, the Board adopted a standard 
providing that the federal employee “must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that his failure to report for work was the result of a threat or other intimidating 
conduct, directed toward him, sufficient to instill in him a reasonable fear of physical danger 
to himself or others, which a person of ordinary firmness would not be expected to resist.”  
Id. at 513. 
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stringent statutory rules which could help create more just and equitable 
immigration policy.356 
CONCLUSION 
While a small patchwork of case law already exists recognizing federal 
common law defenses in removal proceedings, the viability of such defenses in 
this context needs to be more thoroughly and systematically explored.  Under 
the current approach, adjudicators tend to discuss defenses such as duress and 
self-defense in an ad hoc manner, without explicit reference to common law’s 
role or how it interacts with the INA.  This makes it difficult for noncitizens 
and their attorneys to know whether to raise a particular defense and what 
elements they must meet to prove it.  The effect of establishing duress, self-
defense, or other traditional defenses is also currently unclear.  In some cases, 
courts simply treat them as mitigating circumstances that factor into a 
balancing test regarding culpability, while in others, they function as complete 
defenses.  It behooves the BIA and federal appellate courts to issue precedents 




356. Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism: The Discovery of Better 
Environmental Policy, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 705, 707 (2008) (“Common law processes 
allow for greater experimentation and innovation than do set and rigid statutory rules.”). 
357. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
892, 990 (2004) (“Faithful to the separation of powers doctrine, federal courts must in all 
cases look first to the text, purpose, and drafting history of a treaty even in the exercise of 
their implied gap-filling authority.  Only when these more direct sources of guidance fail 
will federal courts have the responsibility to serve the needs of national uniformity by 
crafting a uniform rule of federal law.”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Comment, Customary 
International Law, Foreign Affairs, and Federal Common Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 513, 539 
(2002) (“[I]n a legal tradition that has always relied on common lawmaking, that enacts 
limited statutes against the background of an existing corpus juris of common law rather 
than comprehensive rules like those of the civilians, and in which coherent, well-crafted 
legislation is difficult to enact (far harder, for example, than in parliamentary systems), 
federal common lawmaking has been seen by as a ‘centripetal tool incalculably useful to our 
federal system.’” (quoting Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal 
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 421 (1964))). 
